The Case for Individual Audit Partner Accountability by Honigsberg, Colleen
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 72 
Issue 6 Issue 6 Article 7 
11-2019 
The Case for Individual Audit Partner Accountability 
Colleen Honigsberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Accounting Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Colleen Honigsberg, The Case for Individual Audit Partner Accountability, 72 Vanderbilt Law Review 1871 
(2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol72/iss6/7 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Honigsberg_galley (Do Not Delete) 11/16/2019 12:48 PM 
 
1871 
The Case for Individual Audit Partner 
Accountability 
Colleen Honigsberg* 
Despite repeated regulatory interventions, accounting failures continue 
to persist in companies around the world. In this Article, I explain why 
regulatory oversight, private enforcement, and firm-level reputational sanctions 
are unlikely to induce accountants to take optimal levels of care when auditing 
corporate financials. Instead, our best chance for improving audit quality lies 
in establishing a market for individual audit partners’ brands—a market that 
can hold individual auditors responsible for their mistakes. 
The Article begins by identifying four key benefits to this approach. 
First, forcing auditors to be publicly associated with any audit failures 
occurring on their watch will induce them to increase their effort in order to 
avoid the stigma of failure. Second, now that a significant portion—frequently 
more than half—of audit hours are performed overseas, holding a single 
individual publicly accountable for any audit failures will improve monitoring 
of auditors in other jurisdictions. Third, in light of significant evidence of 
variation in the quality of audit partners—even partners within the same 
firm—exposing that heterogeneity will empower members of audit committees 
and investors to choose auditors more carefully. Finally, commoditizing 
individual auditors could increase industry competition without the need for 
aggressive regulatory action. 
The Article then argues that, in order to spur the development of a 
market in auditor reputation, lawmakers should encourage the development of 
Auditor Scorecards. To do so, regulators should require the disclosure of 
additional auditor-level information and ensure useful information is provided 
through enforcement actions. Although there are costs to these changes, those 
costs are likely to be outweighed by giving investors the information they need 
to develop a common Scorecard for auditor quality. Such Scorecards will help 
 
*  Associate Professor, Stanford Law School. I am very grateful for feedback from Jim Cox, 
Joe Grundfest, Robert J. Jackson, Mark Kelman, Curtis Milhaupt, Joshua Mitts, Randall Thomas, 
and George Triantis, and from participants at seminars hosted by the Institute for Law and 
Economic Policy and Stanford Law School. 
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boards and investors make better use of the legal tools already at their disposal 
to hold auditors accountable when they fail in their gatekeeping function.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Nearly two decades ago, Congress adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 to improve the quality of financial reporting. Yet 2018 
provided evidence that accounting scandals remain all too common. 
From the United States,1 to the United Kingdom,2 to South Africa,3 the 
accounting profession saw a series of high-profile audit failures. 
Perhaps even more damaging to the integrity of the profession, it was 
revealed that KPMG cheated on its regulatory inspections by obtaining 
confidential information from its primary U.S. regulator, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), leading to a criminal 
 
 1. See Chris Dolmetsch, PwC Ordered to Pay $625 Million in Damages Over Bank’s Audit, 
BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-02/pwc-ordered-to-
pay-625-million-to-fdic-over-alabama-bank-audit [https://perma.cc/HE7L-NN8V]; see also Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Deloitte & Touche Agrees to Pay $149.5 Million to Settle Claims 
Arising From Its Audits of Failed Mortgage Lender Taylor, Bean & Whitaker (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deloitte-touche-agrees-pay-1495-million-settle-claims-arising-its-
audits-failed-mortgage [https://perma.cc/P2NC-9SK7]. 
 2. See Caitlin Morrison, Carillion Collapse: Who Was Behind the ‘Recklessness, Hubris and 
Greed’ that Led to the Demise of the Government Contractor?, INDEPENDENT (May 16, 2018), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/carillion-collapse-latest-
who-responsible-richard-adam-howson-philip-green-mp-report-a8353921.html 
[https://perma.cc/6X4L-HGJ5] (describing the failure of Carillion and KPMG’s failure to exercise 
professional scrutiny); see also Madison Marriage, UK Watchdog Issues Damning Report on PwC’s 
Work for BHS, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/85e00736-a072-11e8-85da-
eeb7a9ce36e4 [https://perma.cc/668Q-R9JL] (describing the governmental report issued on PwC’s 
audit of BHS). 
 3. See KPMG South Africa Appeals for Second Chance After Corruption Scandals, REUTERS 
(Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/safrica-kpmg/kpmg-south-africa-appeals-for-
second-chance-after-corruption-scandals-idUSL8N1YF1AT [https://perma.cc/RY7E-5YTJ] 
(describing KPMG’s faulty audits for VBS Mutual Bank and the Gupta family). 
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investigation.4 And these are hardly isolated incidents: from 2005 to 
2016, the PCAOB has found that anywhere from 14 to 33% of the audit 
opinions it inspected should not have been issued.5 It is time to ask: 
Despite the best efforts of Congress, regulators, corporate directors, and 
investors, why do significant audit failures persist? 
In this Article, I argue that the answer to this question lies in 
part in the lack of accountability the law currently provides for 
individual auditors. I explain that the incentives provided by regulatory 
oversight, private enforcement, and firm-level reputational sanctions 
are unlikely to induce socially optimal levels of audit quality. Instead, 
individual reputational sanctions are more likely to give audit partners 
optimal incentives for care. Thus, lawmakers, corporate fiduciaries, and 
investors seeking to improve audit quality should focus on developing a 
market in the reputational brands of individual audit partners. 
Individual brands are common in financial markets.6 Broker-
dealers, for example, provide significant individual disclosure in an 
online database known as Brokercheck, and prior work shows that 
financial advisors’ career outcomes are profoundly affected by these 
disclosures.7 Securities analysts—commonly grouped together with 
auditors as gatekeepers—disclose the name of the lead analyst(s) 
writing the report, again leading to significant reputational 
consequences for individual analysts.8 By contrast, accounting firms 
have fought mightily to resist providing market participants with 
information about individual auditors.  
This Article argues that focusing on individual accountability 
would provide four important benefits. First, individual reputation 
markets for auditors would cause audit partners to more fully 
internalize the costs of an audit failure. Allowing audit partners to 
remain anonymous permits them to enjoy a disproportionate portion of 
the financial benefits provided by an audit client but share the costs of 
failure jointly with other partners of the firm—and those partners are 
imperfect monitors of one another’s conduct. Requiring individual 
partners to take responsibility for their work will better align incentives 
and induce greater levels of effort. 
Second, individual accountability will help mitigate a particular 
audit risk that has increased over the past decade: the reliance on 
 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See Appendix A. 
 6. Individual accountability underscores many required disclosures. For a literature review 
in this area, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the 
Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. L. 675 (2005). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part I. 
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overseas auditors. The limited research on the use of overseas audit 
participants suggests that they are associated with increased risk of 
audit failure.9 But studies also suggest that holding the lead partner to 
a higher level of accountability can, at least in part, counteract the 
increased risk by giving domestic partners strong incentives to monitor 
overseas work.10 
Third, a robust market for individual auditors’ reputation would 
make it easier for audit committees and investors to choose higher-
quality auditors. The evidence shows that there is significant variation 
in audit partner quality, even among partners at the same firm. 
Knowing this information would allow market participants to demand 
higher-quality auditors—while also imposing a penalty on audit 
partners who fail to protect investors. 
Finally, building individual auditor reputation markets could 
increase competition without the need for aggressive regulatory action. 
Over 99% of the S&P 500 select one of the Big Four accounting firms,11 
and commentators have increasingly taken aim at the oligopolistic 
structure of the industry.12 Based on lessons from similar industries, 
such as credit and risk analysts, there is reason to believe that 
individual reputation markets could increase competition and mobility. 
To help market participants develop a robust market for 
individual auditor reputation, this Article proposes the use of Auditor 
Scorecards that describe publicly available information on the lead 
auditor and the audit design for each public company. Such Scorecards 
would provide valuable information to the market—but they would be 
more informative if regulators mandated disclosure of additional 
information that is currently unavailable. First, PCAOB disciplinary 
proceedings are not publicly available until years after the infraction, 
minimizing their utility. These should be disclosed in a timelier 
manner. Second, the current disclosures regarding overseas auditors 
are incomplete and should be supplemented. Finally, some enforcement 
actions regarding poor audit practices name the auditor, but others do 
not. When possible and equitable, the auditor should be named so that 
the information can be incorporated in individual reputation markets. 
 
       9.     See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra Part II.  
 11. John Pakaluk, Auditor Market Share of the S&P 500, AUDIT ANALYTICS (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://blog.auditanalytics.com/auditor-market-share-of-the-sp-500/ [https://perma.cc/55D3-
7UEN]. 
      12.    See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF AUDIT OVERSIGHT 
Financial misconduct has serious consequences that reverberate 
throughout the economy. At a broad economic level, fraud distorts the 
allocation of assets, as fraudulent companies receive funding that would 
be better allocated elsewhere.13 And companies associated with the 
fraudulent company suffer economic setbacks, even if those companies 
played no role in the misconduct.14  
At an individual level, fraud has serious consequences for 
employees and investors. Employees of firms that commit fraud are 
more likely to lose their jobs and to receive lower wages if they do retain 
their jobs.15 Employees may also lose their retirement savings. 
Investors suffer, too. In addition to financial hardship, investors may 
suffer from broken relationships, psychological effects, and mental and 
physical health problems.16  
For these reasons, current law devotes considerable resources to 
preventing fraud. A substantial portion of these resources are devoted 
to ensuring a strong audit function. Public companies are required to 
employ independent auditors, and these auditors are induced to 
perform high-quality work through regulatory oversight, private 
enforcement, and reputational sanctions. In this Part, I describe the 
structural market that provides these incentives. 
A. Regulatory Oversight 
The PCAOB is the primary audit regulator, but the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) also plays a key role. Both 
regulators have a multipronged regulatory approach that includes ex 
ante monitoring and ex post enforcement. Of the two, the PCAOB plays 
a larger monitoring role. Not only does the PCAOB establish auditing 
standards, but it ensures compliance with those standards through 
 
 13. Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2169, 2195 (2009). As an example, consider Theranos, the fraudulent blood-testing company 
that received hundreds of millions of dollars from investors. See Reed Abelson, Theranos Founder 
Elizabeth Holmes Indicted on Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/health/theranos-elizabeth-holmes-fraud.html 
[https://perma.cc/MZP6-U4HZ]. 
 14. See Umit G. Gurun, Noah Stoffman & Scott E. Yonker, Trust Busting: The Effect of Fraud 
on Investor Behavior, 31 REV. FIN. STUD. 1341, 1344–45 (2018). 
 15. Jung Ho Choi & Brandon Gipper, Fraudulent Financial Reporting and the Consequences 
for Employees 38–39 (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 19-19, 2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3346759 [https://perma.cc/7TPN-9WHU]. 
 16. Mark Button, Chris Lewis & Jacki Tapley, Not a Victimless Crime: The Impact of Fraud 
on Individual Victims and Their Families, 27 SECURITY J. 36, 42–43 (2014). 
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annual inspections of accounting firms.17 In effect, the PCAOB audits 
the audit firms. Further, because the PCAOB’s mission is to protect 
investors more broadly, the PCAOB also mandates new disclosures 
relating to the auditing process that should, in theory, allow investors 
to play a greater monitoring role.18 
By contrast, although the SEC’s Office of the Chief Accountant 
also plays a role in monitoring auditors, the SEC’s regulation of 
auditors is generally better known for its ex post enforcement.19 The 
SEC can sanction accountants or, in severe cases, bar them from 
serving as public company auditors.20 The PCAOB can bring 
disciplinary orders as well, but the PCAOB orders tend to concern 
inspection-related infractions while SEC actions are more likely to be 
brought in instances of fraud.21 Further, PCAOB disciplinary orders can 
be appealed to the SEC,22 meaning that the SEC has significant control 
over the PCAOB’s enforcement mechanism. 
B. Private Enforcement 
Under the traditional framework in corporate law, shareholders 
(the principal) hire firm managers (the agents). Auditing adds 
additional complexity to this model. The shareholders elect the board of 
directors, and the board of directors acts through the audit committee 
to hire and fire the auditor. Like the board of directors, the auditor 
works for the benefit of shareholders. In effect, shareholders are subject 
to two agency relationships: one with the audit committee and another 
 
 17. Fast Answers: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerspcaobhtm.html (last modified Jan. 16, 
2013) [https://perma.cc/MA9R-DF7E]. 
 18. Id.; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 107, 116 Stat. 745, 765–
66 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7217) (new disclosures are subject to SEC approval). 
 19. Fast Answers, supra note 17. The SEC also oversees the PCAOB. It approves the PCAOB’s 
budget, appoints the board members, and must approve certain disciplinary measures, meaning 
that the SEC has significant control over the PCAOB. Although the PCAOB and SEC are the 
primary auditing regulators, auditors can be targeted by any number of government actors. For 
example, the Department of Justice and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation also bring cases 
against auditors. 
 20. See, e.g., Simcha Baer, CPA, Exchange Act Release No. 82736, 2018 WL 922498 (Feb. 16, 
2018) (barring an accountant from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an 
accountant). 
 21. Simi Kedia, Urooj Khan & Shivaram Rajgopal, The SEC’s Enforcement Record Against 
Auditors 23 (Feb. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2947469 [https://perma.cc/WJ5Y-8S2H]; see also Joshua Nichols, 
Examining Sanctions for Accountants Under SEC Rule of Practice 102(e)(1), VEDDER PRICE 10, 11–
12 (2016), https://www.vedderprice.com/-/media/files/vedder-thinking/publications/2016/12/ 
securities-litigation-and-government-enforcement-t.pdf [https://perma.cc/782K-SMNG]. 
      22.   Fast Answers, supra note 17. 
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with the auditor. This means the shareholders can discipline the 
auditor directly (either through litigation or shareholder voting) or 
indirectly through the audit committee (through termination).  
1. Litigation Against Audit Firms 
In theory, the risk of shareholder litigation provides auditors 
with a strong incentive to perform high-quality audits. Although 
auditors can be sued by any number of parties,23 the incentives created 
by shareholder litigation—and the payouts from these cases—are 
typically considered most influential.24 
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly 
restricted shareholders’ ability to sue auditors.25 Shareholder litigation 
against auditors occurs primarily under the federal securities laws—
typically Rule 10b-5.26 Broadly stated, under Rule 10b-5, actors can be 
liable as “primary actors” (those who performed the bad act themselves) 
or “secondary actors” (those who assisted the primary actor in her bad 
act). Traditionally, secondary actor liability provided a realistic threat 
that a poor audit could lead to liability, but auditors were rarely held 
liable as primary violators because they typically did not commit the 
fraud themselves.  
However, beginning with Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver in 199427 and extending through Janus 
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders in 2011, the Court has 
 
 23. In addition to shareholders, auditors are frequently sued by, for example, clients, banks, 
and insurance companies. Jennifer J. Gaver, Jeffrey S. Paterson & Carl J. Pacini, The Influence of 
Auditor State-Level Legal Liability on Conservative Financial Reporting in the Property-Casualty 
Insurance Industry, 31 AUDITING, Aug. 2012, at 95, 120; see also Divya Anantharaman, Jeffrey A. 
Pittman & Nader Wans, State Liability Regimes Within the United States and Auditor Reporting, 
91 ACCT. REV. 1545, 1545–46 (2016). 
 24. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, 
Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting 6 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & 
Econ. Studies Working Paper No. 191, 2001), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=270944 [https://perma.cc/CC4N-FYVK]; see 
also Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
365, 370 (2004). 
 25. Private Securities Fraud Claims Under Section 10(b) Based on False or Misleading 
Statements, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 3 (2011), https://www.sullcrom.com/ 
siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Private_Securities_Fraud_Claims_Under_Section_10b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6386-FWJA]. 
 26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019). Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act, is the broadest antifraud rule under federal securities law. It is the most frequent 
shareholder claim brought against auditors. See Colleen Honigsberg et al., The Changing 
Landscape of Auditor Litigation 22 (Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 512, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3074923 [https://perma.cc/PM2B-269W]. 
Common law notions of privity prevent most state law claims. See Gaver, supra note 23, at 96.  
27  511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
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increasingly restricted the scope of secondary actor liability under Rule 
10b-5.28 The law now requires shareholder plaintiffs to argue that the 
auditor should be liable as a primary actor—a far more difficult feat 
than arguing the auditor should be liable as a secondary actor. 
Although the Court appeared to step back from the most extreme 
limitations of its Janus decision in the more recent Lorenzo v. SEC,29 
even a lenient interpretation of Janus imposes significant limitations 
on auditor liability.  
Perhaps in response to the narrowing of secondary actor liability 
under Rule 10b-5, Section 11 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 
has begun to play an increasing role in shareholder litigation against 
auditors.30 However, Section 11 is an imperfect substitute. Not only 
does it have a shorter statute of limitations than Rule 10b-5,31 but it 
applies only to registration statements (and documents incorporated by 
reference).32 By contrast, Rule 10b-5 applies more broadly.  
2. Shareholder Voting 
Shareholder voting can also provide a check on auditors’ work. 
An estimated 80 to 95% of companies request that their shareholders 
ratify the company’s auditor.33 These votes are routinely favorable. 
According to Audit Analytics, 98% of votes cast from January 1, 2014 
 
 28. 564 U.S. 135 (2011); see Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 13; infra notes 86–98 and 
accompanying text. 
 29. 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1103 (2019). Justice Clarence Thomas, the author of Janus, wrote a 
forceful dissent in Lorenzo, arguing that the majority opinion made no real effort to reconcile its 
opinion with Janus. See id. at 1105–11 (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, even if Lorenzo is more 
lenient than Janus, it does not seem sufficiently lenient to roll back established precedent for 
pleading Rule 10b-5 claims against auditors.  
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). See Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 21–22, 53. From 1996–
1998, 91% of securities cases against auditors alleged a violation of Rule 10b-5, and only 28% 
alleged a violation of Section 11. By contrast, from 2014–2016, 69% of securities cases against 
auditors alleged a violation of Rule 10b-5, and 54% alleged a violation of Section 11. Id. 
 31. SOX’s extension of the statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 does not apply to Section 11. 
See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 02 Civ.3288 (DLC), 03 Civ.9499 (DLC), 2004 WL 
1435356, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004); see also In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. 
Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
      32.    See 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
 33. Cory A. Cassell, Tyler Kleppe & Jonathan E. Shipman, Uninformed Shareholders and the 
Efficacy of Proxy Voting 8 (Apr. 6, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3113807 [https://perma.cc/422Z-VYYT]. 
Many companies hold a vote on the auditor because it is a “routine” matter supported by 
management, meaning that brokers can vote shares without their customers’ direction; as long as 
there is at least one such “routine” vote, broker non-votes can be counted towards a quorum. John 
Pakaluk, Auditor Ratification: Shareholders Appear Content, AUDIT ANALYTICS BLOG (Oct. 21, 
2013), https://blog.auditanalytics.com/auditor-ratification-shareholders-appear-content/ 
[https://perma.cc/4MDU-8FTZ].  
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through December 31, 2016 were cast in favor of auditor ratification.34 
Although such high favorability could indicate satisfaction with the 
auditor, these votes are usually considered perfunctory and 
uninformed.35 
3. Termination 
Although the shareholders cannot directly fire the auditor, their 
agent (the audit committee) can do so. In theory, the risk of termination 
should incentivize auditors to perform high-quality work to keep their 
job.36 However, there are significant costs to firing an auditor.37 Indeed, 
issuers and auditors tend to have very sticky relationships. For 
example, over 175 firms in the S&P 500 have had the same auditor for 
over twenty-five years.38 For large public companies, terminating the 
company’s auditor is a rare event.  
C. Reputational Risk 
Alongside regulatory oversight and private enforcement, 
reputational risk is thought to provide audit firms—especially large, 
 
 34. Jessica McKeon, Auditor Ratification: A Closer Look at Votes Against, AUDIT ANALYTICS 
BLOG (Jan. 17, 2017), https://blog.auditanalytics.com/auditor-ratification-a-closer-look-at-votes-
against/ [https://perma.cc/A7JP-AM23]. 
 35. See Cassell, Kleppe & Shipman, supra note 33, at 7.  
 36. Financial intermediaries usually push companies to hire one of the Big Four/Big Five 
auditors, where these are the big audit firms considered to be part of the oligopoly. These firms 
are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, and prior to its demise, 
Arthur Andersen (this group is frequently referred to as the Big N because its size was reduced 
from the Big Five to the Big Four after the demise of Arthur Andersen). See, e.g., Sadok El Ghoul, 
Omrane Guedhami & Jeffrey Pittman, Cross-Country Evidence on the Importance of Big Four 
Auditors to Equity Pricing: The Mediating Role of Legal Institutions, 54 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 60, 
68 (2016) (finding that the cost of equity is reduced when an issuer hires a Big N auditor); 
Krishnagopal Menon & David D. Williams, Auditor Credibility and Initial Public Offerings, 66 
ACCT. REV. 313, 330 (1991) (finding that investment banks push new firms to the large auditors); 
Vivien Beattie & Stella Fearnley, Audit Market Competition: Auditor Changes and the Impact of 
Tendering, 30 BRITISH ACCT. REV. 261, 276–77 (1998) (finding, based on interviews in the United 
Kingdom, that firms switch into the Big N because of the influence of banks or underwriters, the 
influence of equity or loan providers, the need for more capacity, the need for a multinational 
capability, and just generally the need for a Big N firm (listed in order of descending frequency of 
response)). Note that the audit market for issuers is heavily concentrated, but that this contrasts 
with the broker-dealer market, where there are thousands of audit firms. See Jonathan Aaron 
Cook et al., Auditors Are Known by the Companies They Keep (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., 
Working Paper No. 19-12, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326595 
[https://perma.cc/U2JE-FL39]. 
 37. See infra Part II. 
 38. See David Ingram & Dena Aubin, Insight: Big 4 Auditors Spend More Than Ever on US 
Lobbying, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-accounting-
big4/insight-big-4-auditors-spend-more-than-ever-on-u-s-lobbying-idUSBRE82C0JQ20120313 
[https://perma.cc/KX6M-M4Q2].  
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successful audit firms—with significant incentives to perform high-
quality work. Auditors sell their reputation, and theory suggests that 
high-quality clients would be unwilling to hire an auditor with a 
tarnished reputation.  
1. Firm Reputation 
Prior research has provided evidence consistent with the 
intuition that high-quality clients do not want to be associated with a 
low-quality audit firm. For example, large public companies 
overwhelmingly employ one of the Big Four audit firms, which are 
commonly perceived to be of higher quality. Theoretically, these firms 
have more to lose in litigation (they are thought to be attractive 
litigation targets because they have relatively deep pockets), and a 
sufficiently large client base to resist pressure from a single client. 
Some empirical evidence supports the contention that these firms are, 
in fact, of higher quality.39 
An interesting feature of firm-level auditor reputation in the 
United States, however, is that the Big Four appear to enjoy such an 
established brand advantage that their reputation is relatively 
unaffected by typical audit failures. Although there is some evidence 
from abroad that public companies may drop an affiliate of a Big Four 
auditor after a high-profile failure,40 this pattern is not present in the 
United States.41 As described in Section II.A.2, there are many possible 
explanations for the Big Four’s seeming immunity from competition, 
 
 39. E.g., Mark DeFond & Jieying Zhang, A Review of Archival Auditing Research, 58 J. ACCT. 
& ECON. 275, 299 (2014); Jere R. Francis, Matthew L. Pinnuck & Olena Watanabe, Auditor Style 
and Financial Statement Comparability, 89 ACCT. REV. 605, 628 (2014); Denise Dickins et al., 
ICYMI | Not All PCAOB Inspections Are Created Equal, CPA J. (2018), 
https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/08/30/icymi-not-all-pcaob-inspections-are-created-equal/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q7GC-XFW6]. 
 40. See, e.g., Douglas J. Skinner & Suraj Srinivasan, Audit Quality and Auditor Reputation: 
Evidence from Japan, 87 ACCT. REV 1737, 1738–39 (2012) (finding that, following a short 
suspension, the Japanese affiliate of PwC lost approximately one-quarter of its clients); Joseph 
Weber, Michael Willenborg & Jieying Zhang, Does Auditor Reputation Matter? The Case of KPMG 
Germany and ComROAD AG, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 941, 944 (2008) (finding an increase in the number 
of clients dropping KPMG following a scandal in Germany); Loni Prinsloo & John Bowker, KPMG 
Loses More South African Staff from Gupta Fallout, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-25/kpmg-is-said-to-lose-more-south-african-
staff-from-gupta-fallout [https://perma.cc/Y8HM-S4W8] (describing KPMG’s loss of clients after 
the recent Gupta scandal in South Africa). 
 41. See Kedia, Khan & Rajgopal, supra note 21, at 29. See also Matthew Baugh et al., Did the 
2005 Deferred Prosecution Agreement Adversely Impact KPMG’s Tax and/or Audit Practices?, 38 
AUDITING, Feb. 2019, at 77, 95 (finding that KPMG’s audit practice was not affected by the legal 
challenges its tax practice faced). 
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including market pressures, the costs required to get a new auditor up 
to speed, and a lack of other options.42 
2. Individual Reputation 
Finally, in theory, individual reputational risk could induce 
high-quality audits. However, to date, auditors have had limited 
individual reputational constraints in American markets. With that 
being said, research in other securities contexts suggests that 
individual reputational constraints can provide powerful incentives to 
perform high-quality work.  
a. Reputation in Capital Markets 
Prior work has shown, for example, that managers who are 
present when a firm commits financial misconduct and fail to prevent 
it suffer adverse career consequences. Directors are more likely to 
depart a firm following earnings restatements or financial fraud,43 and 
CEOs have difficulty finding new management roles when they leave 
after regulatory enforcement actions are revealed.44 Similarly, financial 
advisors, for whom individual detail on prior misconduct is available in 
online regulatory databases, suffer negative career consequences upon 
committing misconduct.45 
Financial analysts, too, are subject to reputation markets. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Wall Street Journal published a list 
of “All-Star Analysts,”46 and significant research has shown that being 
 
 42. See infra Section II.A.2.c. 
 43. Suraj Srinivasan, Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: 
Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 291, 331 
(2005); see also Hemang Desai, Chris E. Hogan & Michael S. Wilkins, The Reputational Penalty 
for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover, 81 ACCT. REV. 83, 
108 (2006); Karen M. Hennes, Andrew J. Leone & Brian P. Miller, The Importance of 
Distinguishing Errors from Irregularities in Restatement Research: The Case of Restatements and 
CEO/CFO Turnover, 83 ACCT. REV. 1487, 1515, 1517 (2008). 
 44. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and 
Shareholder Wealth, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 307 (Nov. 2007). 
 45. See Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, The Market for Financial Adviser 
Misconduct, 127 J. POL. ECON. 233, 261–71 (2019) (showing that advisors are more likely to depart 
their firm after misconduct and have a slightly worse prospect of reemployment than advisors with 
no instances of misconduct; and those who find employment with a new firm are, on average, likely 
to land a less prestigious employment); see also Colleen Honigsberg & Matthew Jacob, Deleting 
Misconduct: The Expungement of Brokercheck Records (Nov. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3284738 [https://perma.cc/87ES-2QNQ] 
(showing that brokers with successful expungements have better career outcomes). 
 46. Looking Back at the Best on the Street, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2012, 11:51 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304811304577370093584392220#7 
[https://perma.cc/Y999-AD3H]; see also John R. Dorfman, Sixteen All-Stars Excel for the Fifth 
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on that list is associated with substantial professional rewards. One 
study found that Star Analysts were more likely to move to the buy side 
following industry turmoil.47 Another found that Star Analysts earn 
61% more than unrated peers.48 And another found that Star Analysts 
enjoyed increased job mobility following regulatory reform.49 Because 
analysts, like auditors, are commonly considered gatekeepers, research 
on analyst reputation markets may be especially relevant for 
lawmakers considering how to improve audit outcomes.50 
b. Reputation Markets in the Auditing Industry 
By comparison, accounting firms have successfully resisted rules 
that would produce public disclosure of individual auditor information, 
allowing audit partners to hide behind their firms’ reputations.51 The 
resulting incentives have a concerning implication for investors: each 
individual partner is incentivized to accommodate firm managers, even 
at the expense of audit quality.  
To see why, consider the following. Audit partners’ 
compensation is significantly determined by whether they maintain or 
increase their client base.52 Further, many Big Four partners leave to 
work in industry.53 Therefore, each partner’s principal objectives are to 
keep her clients and to appease potential future clients and employers. 
Relative to the firm, each partner will receive a disproportionate share 
 
Time, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 1997), 
https://www.wsj.com/public/current/articles/SB866661569251491500.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EXK8-ML6C]. 
 47. Yuyan Guan, Hai Lu & M.H. Franco Wong, Regulations and Brain Drain: Evidence from 
the Wall Street Star Analysts’ Career Choices 24 (Jan. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www-2.rotman.utoronto.ca/facbios/file/GLW_Jan28_2013_fullversion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/65KZ-PF35].  
 48. Boris Groysberg, Paul M. Healy & David A. Maber, What Drives Sell-Side Analyst 
Compensation at High-Status Investment Banks?, 49 J. ACCT. RES. 969, 971 (2011). 
 49. See Yuyan Guan et al., Regulations and Brain Drain: Evidence from Wall Street Star 
Analysts’ Career Choices, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 27), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3243135 [https://perma.cc/8GHA-Q9X9]. 
 50. Of course, the comparison is not identical—analysts succeed by making accurate 
predictions; auditors succeed by preventing failure (a relatively binary outcome). 
 51. Barring relatively infrequent instances, the name of the partner conducting the audit has 
historically been confidential, so the reputational focus is on the firm or firm office. 
 52. W. Robert Knechel, Lasse Niemi & Mikko Zerni, Empirical Evidence on the Implicit 
Determinants of Compensation in Big 4 Audit Partnerships, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 349, 350, 376–78 
(2013) (analyzing Big Four compensation in Sweden); see also Paul J. Coram & Matthew J. 
Robinson, Professionalism and Performance Incentives in Accounting Firms, 31 ACCT. HORIZONS 
103, 105, 118–19 (2017) (examining Big Four compensation in Australia). 
 53. See Anne Albrecht, Elaine G. Mauldin & Nathan J. Newton, Do Auditors Recognize the 
Potential Dark Side of Executives’ Accounting Competence?, ACCT. REV., Nov. 2018, at 1, 9 (finding 
that 18.2% of firms between 2004 and 2013 had at least one executive with either audit manager 
or audit partner experience). 
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of the fees paid by that client—and other potential benefits in the form 
of non–Big Four employment. However, because the market will not 
know the partner’s identity—only that of her firm and perhaps her 
associated office—she will share the risk of an audit failure jointly with 
other partners at her same firm.  
Recognizing this problem, in 2009 the PCAOB proposed 
mandating disclosure of the individual audit partner leading public 
company audits.54 The accounting industry strongly opposed the 
disclosure, arguing that it would significantly increase their risk of 
litigation for little benefit.55 For example, they argued that the 
disclosure could increase their risk of Section 11 liability (a claim the 
SEC disputed).56 The firms also argued that the disclosure could 
increase their risk of Rule 10b-5 liability and/or cause individual 
auditors to be named in lawsuits.57 
In response to concerns of increased litigation risk, in December 
2015, the PCAOB adopted a new rule that required disclosure of the 
audit partner in a different format.58 The new PCAOB Form AP, 
Auditor Reporting of Certain Audit Participants, would be filed on the 
PCAOB’s website rather than with the issuer’s filings—that is, the 
name of the engagement partner would not be disclosed in the audit 
report, but in an entirely separate location. The SEC approved the rules 
requiring Form AP in May 2016,59 and audit firms became required to 
file the form in conjunction with audit reports issued on or after 
January 31, 2017.60 
It is too soon to know the effect of the disclosure (if any). The 
initial research is split on its effect, with some studies suggesting that 
 
 54. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE NO. 2009-005, CONCEPT RELEASE ON 
REQUIRING THE ENGAGEMENT PARTNER TO SIGN THE AUDIT REPORT 7–8 (2009), 
https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket029/2009-07-28_Release_No_2009-005.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L6GN-JX6J].  
 55. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE NO. 2015-004, SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST 
FOR COMMENT: RULES TO REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN AUDIT PARTICIPANTS ON A NEW 
PCAOB FORM 4 (2015), https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket029/Release_2015_004.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P34J-F4F7].  
 56. See Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rules to Require Disclosure of Certain Audit 
Participants on a New PCAOB Form and Related Amendments to Auditing Standards, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-77787, at 6–7 (May 9, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/2016/34-
77787.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMK4-TMXR] [hereinafter Order Granting Approval of Proposed 
Rules] (discussing the concern over increased liability and the PCAOB’s response). 
 57. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 55, at 4–5. 
 58. News Release, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., PCAOB Adopts Rules Requiring 
Disclosure of the Engagement Partner (Dec. 15, 2015), 
https://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/PCAOB-adopts-disclosure-rules-Form-AP-12-15-
15.aspx [https://perma.cc/N8V6-UWD3]. 
 59. See Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rules, supra note 56.  
 60. Id.  
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it may have increased audit quality (and audit fees), and other work 
finding no effect.61 As a practical matter, however, the name of the audit 
partner seems unlikely to provide investors with significant 
information until those investors know more about that individual 
through, for example, Auditor Scorecards.  
II. THE CASE FOR INDIVIDUAL AUDITOR REPUTATION  
In this Part, I note that existing deterrence mechanisms have 
failed to produce optimal audit quality. Then, I describe the arguments 
for and against individual auditor reputation markets. In favor, I note 
that the existing deterrence mechanisms are ineffective, and that 
individual brands would improve audit quality by realigning the 
incentives of the auditor, improving the ability of audit committees and 
investors to select a high-quality auditor, and arguably increasing 
competition. However, I note potential objections such as the 
possibilities of increased audit fees, litigation, and/or risk aversion. 
A. Existing Deterrence Mechanisms 
In evaluating the effectiveness of existing mechanisms, it is 
important to distinguish the optimal failure rate for audit “outcomes” 
(for example, restatements) from the optimal failure rate for audit 
“inputs” (for example, failing to perform the audit in accordance with 
auditing standards). The optimal failure of inputs should be far lower 
than the optimal failure of outcomes and close to zero. After all, auditing 
standards are adopted after a rigorous review process and are designed 
to balance the need for cost-effective audits with the need to prevent 
audit failure outcomes.  
The best evidence of the quality of audit inputs comes from 
PCAOB inspections. Figure 1 shows the frequency of “not sufficient” 
audits uncovered by the PCAOB during their inspections. An audit is 
deemed not sufficient if the PCAOB believed the auditor lacked 
sufficient evidence to issue an opinion (stated simply, an audit is 
deemed not sufficient if the PCAOB believes the auditor did not follow 
 
 61. Compare Lauren Cunningham, Chan Li, Sarah E. Stein & Nicole Wright, What’s in a 
Name? Initial Evidence of U.S. Audit Partner Identification Using Difference-in-Differences 
Analyses, 94 ACCT. REV. 139 (2019) (finding no significant increase in audit fees and/or audit 
quality on average), with Jenna Burke, Rani Hoitash & Udi Hoitash, Audit Partner Identification 
and Characteristics: Evidence from U.S. Form AP Filings, 38 AUDITING, Aug. 2019 (finding a 
significant increase in audit fees and audit quality in the first year after adoption). See also infra 
Part II (discussing other recent research). 
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auditing standards). From 2005 to 2016, the number of “not sufficient” 
audits ranged from 14 to 33% with no discernable trend.62  
 
FIGURE 1: PCAOB INSPECTIONS, 2005 TO 2016 
 
These are striking statistics. Although the sample of audits 
selected for inspection is not randomly chosen and likely to be more 
problematic than the full set of audits,63 a finding that, on average, 25% 
of audit opinions inspected should not have been issued cannot be 
optimal. Further, the lack of a decline is notable, as it suggests that 
firms are not learning from the PCAOB’s inspection process.64 These 
 
 62. See Appendix A. As an example of an audit lacking sufficient evidence, consider the 
PCAOB’s 2014 inspection report for MaloneBailey. The issuer in question recognized full revenue 
upon the customer’s acceptance of delivery despite the fact that the contracts indicated the issuer 
had ongoing obligations beyond delivery. Under basic accounting principles, revenue should be 
recognized when earned. If the issuer has not fulfilled all obligations of the contract, it cannot 
recognize full revenue. This basic tenet was not followed, and the PCAOB noted there was no 
evidence in the audit documentation that the auditor had performed standard procedures to 
determine whether the issuer’s revenue recognition was correct. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT 
BD., 2013 INSPECTION OF MALONEBAILEY, LLP 5–6 (2014), 
https://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/Documents/2015_MaloneBailey_LLP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QNS9-CMWF]. 
 63. The PCAOB conducts risk-based inspections, meaning that it uses internally developed 
factors to predict audit failure and weighs the predicted failure rates when selecting audits to 
inspect. However, the PCAOB must inspect the eleven accounting firms with more than one 
hundred issuers annually, while accounting firms with fewer than one hundred issuers are 
generally inspected triennially. As such, the inspections are risk-based, conditional on the firms 
subject to inspection. Therefore, the audits inspected are often considered to disproportionately 
represent large issuers in complex industries that have experienced prior accounting failures. 
 64. These trends are not limited to the United States. European regulators also find high 
failure rates in the audits they inspect. See John C. Coffee, Why Do Auditors Fail? What Might 
Work? What Won’t? (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 597, 
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findings lead us to question why the existing deterrence methods 
described above do not induce better behavior. 
1. Regulatory Authorities 
Despite the reforms imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“SOX”), there remain several reasons to expect regulation to provide 
suboptimal levels of deterrence. First, there is evidence that accounting 
regulators suffer from regulatory capture. Second, lobbying by 
accounting firms has successfully deterred and/or eliminated regulation 
meant to incentivize high-quality audits. Third, following the collapse 
of Arthur Andersen, regulators have been reluctant to impose penalties 
that could further reduce the size of the accounting market.  
a. Regulatory Capture at the PCAOB 
Stated broadly, regulatory capture is the process through which 
special interests infiltrate the regulatory process and advance their own 
interests at the public’s expense.65 When capture occurs, the regulatory 
process is upended and becomes ineffective.  
Capture can occur for many reasons. However, in financial 
services, a common explanation for capture is that regulators cater to 
the entities they are supposed to regulate in order to receive lucrative 
job offers from those entities upon leaving the regulatory organization.66 
To mitigate these concerns, the PCAOB is limited to two CPAs on its 
board of five members.67 
Nonetheless, capture remains a concern. A recent study found 
that accounting firms with worse PCAOB inspection results hire more 
 
2019), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2293/ [https://perma.cc/V2T5-
3WXM].  
 65. For example, an industry might propose rules that restrict entrance into a market, thus 
benefitting the existing players. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of 
Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089 (1991); Sam 
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
 66. For example, “between 2006 and 2010, 219 former SEC employees filed 789 post-
employment statements indicating their intent to represent an outside client before the 
Commission.” PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, REVOLVING REGULATORS: SEC FACES ETHICS 
CHALLENGES WITH REVOLVING DOOR 2 (2011), http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/revolving-regulators-
20110513.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NBJ-QRS9]. 
 67. Lewis H. Ferguson, Board Member, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Remarks on 
Investor Protection Through Audit Oversight (Sept. 21, 2012), 
https://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/09212012_FergusonCalState.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/4UJR-299G].  
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PCAOB employees into senior-level positions68—after which inspection 
results improve. Although this could reflect an improvement in audit 
quality, the authors found no change in the frequency of restatements 
or SEC enforcement actions; the improvement was limited to inspection 
findings.69 
With this in mind, the facts cited in the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) indictment against former KPMG and PCAOB employees bear 
mention.70 Relative to the other Big Four firms, KPMG scored poorly on 
its PCAOB audit inspections. To improve its performance, it hired 
former PCAOB employees and demanded that these employees provide 
confidential PCAOB data detailing the audits to be inspected. These 
newly hired KPMG employees complied, stealing confidential 
information on their way out the door and wringing further confidential 
information out of a former colleague at the PCAOB after they had 
exited.  
The result was that KPMG cheated on its PCAOB inspections 
for years. By obtaining the list of audits to be inspected, KPMG 
essentially had the answers to the exam in advance. Two defendants 
have already pled guilty, two were convicted at trial, and two still face 
ongoing charges.71 
b. Lobbying Efforts of the Big Four 
Lobbying, too, has limited the effectiveness of regulatory 
authorities. A Reuters report found that the Big Four spent $9.4 million 
on in-house and outside lobbyists in 201272—a figure that has steadily 
 
 68. Bradley E. Hendricks, Wayne R. Landsman & F. Dimas Pena-Romera, The Revolving 
Door Between the PCAOB and Large Audit Firms 2, 5 (May 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/acct_05_18_hendricks.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBG8-
DYER].  
 69. Id. at 26. 
 70. Press Release No. 18-023, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 5 Former KPMG Executives and PCAOB 
Employees Charged in Manhattan Federal Court for Fraudulent Scheme to Sell Valuable and 
Confidential PCAOB Information and Use that Information to Fraudulently Improve KPMG 
Inspection Results (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/5-former-kpmg-
executives-and-pcaob-employees-charged-manhattan-federal-court-fraudulent 
[https://perma.cc/X6MQ-79ZQ]; Press Release No. 19-075, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former KPMG 
Executive and Former PCAOB Employee Convicted of Wire Fraud for Scheme to Steal and Use 
Confidential PCAOB Information (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-
kpmg-executive-and-former-pcaob-employee-convicted-wire-fraud-scheme-steal-and 
[https://perma.cc/RY5A-R6ZJ]. 
 71. See Press Release No. 18-023, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 70 (stating that five 
defendants were charged and a sixth pled guilty); Press Release No. 19-075, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
supra note 70 (noting that two of the original five charged were convicted). The cases against the 
remaining defendants are ongoing. 
 72. Ingram & Aubin, supra note 38. See also Richard L. Cassin, Ex-KPMG Partner Pleads 
Guilty in PCAOB Cheating Scandal, THE FCPA BLOG (Oct. 7, 2019, 1:38 PM), 
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increased over time.73 Another report stated that accountants are “in 
the same category of more established big donors like telephone 
companies, higher education and the building trade unions.”74 
This money comes with strings. Accounting firms have 
successfully deterred and/or eliminated regulation that, in theory, 
would incentivize high-quality audits. For example, despite multiple 
bills by members of Congress75 and pushes by PCAOB members,76 
PCAOB disciplinary proceedings are currently nonpublic. The 
proceedings only become public after a settlement or when litigation is 
complete (including the completion of any appeals).77 These restrictions 
prevent investors from learning of infractions in a timely manner.78 
 
https://fcpablog.com/2019/10/07/ex-kpmg-partner-pleads-guilty-in-pcaob-cheating-scandal/ 
[https://perma.cc/8QFF-VWGK]. 
 73. See Ingram & Aubin, supra note 38. (“Even going back to 1999, the earliest year for which 
online reports are available, annual spending by the industry, including the now-defunct Arthur 
Andersen, was lower than last year’s.”). 
 74. Stephen Labaton, Enron’s Collapse: The Lobbying; Auditing Firms Exercise Power in 
Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/19/business/enron-s-
collapse-the-lobbying-auditing-firms-exercise-power-in-washington.html [https://perma.cc/V47E-
L6SF]. 
 75. See Laura Tieger Salisbury, Senators Revive Bill to Make PCAOB Disciplinary Actions 
Public, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 21, 2017, 6:34 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporate-
law/senators-revive-bill-to-make-pcaob-disciplinary-actions-public [https://perma.cc/AT6F-
WVVW]; Robert Schmidt & Anthony Capaccio, Is Your Auditor Being Investigated? New Law May 
Expose Misdeeds, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-04/is-your-auditor-being-investigated-new-
law-may-expose-misdeeds [https://perma.cc/3VR5-HGSB]. 
 76. See, e.g., Claudius B. Modesti, Dir. of Enf’t, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Speech at 
the New York State Society of CPAs’ SEC Conference: The Need for Transparency in PCAOB 
Disciplinary Proceedings (Sept. 28, 2010), https://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/09282010_ 
ModestiTransparency.aspx [https://perma.cc/35QL-LFFM] (discussing a proposed amendment to 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to make PCOAB disciplinary proceedings public). 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(d) (2012). The proceedings are only made public prior to completion if 
the PCAOB finds good cause to make them public and all parties consent to making them public. 
15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(2); see also Modesti, supra note 76 (“Right now, the PCAOB is virtually unique 
among similar regulators in that our disciplinary proceedings are required by law to be kept 
confidential through charging, hearings, initial decision, and even appeal.”). 
 78. Press Release, Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator for Iowa, Reed and Grassley Seek to 
Increase Transparency at Accounting Watchdog (Nov. 18, 2011), 
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/reed-and-grassley-seek-increase-
transparency-accounting-watchdog [https://perma.cc/T4D3-UHPD]. As another example of the Big 
Four’s lobbying influence, the PCAOB previously pushed for mandatory rotations of the audit firm, 
as opposed to only a mandatory rotation of the audit partner—a change that the Big Four opposed. 
The change never materialized. Vincent Ryan, PCAOB Abandons Auditor Rotation, CFO (Feb. 6, 
2014), http://www.cfo.com/auditing/2014/02/pcaob-abandons-auditor-rotation/ 
[https://perma.cc/8V8J-PT55]. 
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c. Reluctance to Reduce the Size of the Accounting Market 
After Arthur Andersen’s collapse reduced the Big Five to the Big 
Four, regulators have been handicapped in imposing severe penalties 
because they are hesitant to cause the collapse of another large 
accounting firm—and therefore further reduce competition. For 
example, in 2005, the DOJ filed tax fraud charges against eight 
partners at KPMG.79 The misconduct was egregious. In addition to tax 
fraud, there was strong evidence that KMPG itself was guilty of 
obstruction.80 
Documents released from the negotiations between the DOJ and 
KPMG indicate that there were discussions about whether any 
agreement would “put KPMG under” or “kill” the firm.81 In sum, KPMG 
feared that if it were put under federal indictment like Arthur 
Andersen, it would be unable to survive. In the end, the DOJ charged 
eight partners with tax fraud and required the firm to pay $456 million 
in penalties, but KPMG itself was spared from a potentially lethal 
criminal indictment.82 
In KPMG’s most recent example of bad behavior—when it 
cheated on its PCAOB inspections—the firm was spared again. 
Although the DOJ brought criminal charges against individual 
employees for their role in helping KPMG cheat on its PCAOB audit 
inspections, KPMG itself was not indicted.83 As in the 2005 scandal, 
regulators were hesitant to bring charges against the firm for fear of 
reducing the Big Four to the Big Three.84 This concern reduces 
 
 79. Jonathan D. Glater, 8 Former Partners of KPMG Are Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2005), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/30/business/8-former-partners-of-kpmg-are-indicted.html 
[https://perma.cc/CBZ8-ERMD]. 
 80. See John R. Wilke, KPMG Faces Indictment Risk on Tax Shelters, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 
2005, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB111888827431261200 [https://perma.cc/Q5M2-
ZEYL] (“KPMG tried for years to delay or conceal evidence behind misleading and sometimes false 
claims of legal privilege.”). 
 81. Francine McKenna, US Department of Justice v KPMG: Document Shows “Too Few To 
Fail” Was Opening Premise, RE: THE AUDITORS (Apr. 19, 2014), 
http://retheauditors.com/2014/04/19/us-department-of-justice-v-kpmg-document-shows-too-few-
to-fail-was-opening-premise/ [https://perma.cc/BER8-3E6N]. 
 82. Press Release No. 05-433, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal 
Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case (Aug. 29, 2005) 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/August/05_ag_433.html [https://perma.cc/H85P-
2NM9]. 
 83. See Press Release No. 18-023, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 70 (discussing charges 
against former KPMG executives and PCAOB employees); Press Release No. 19-075, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, supra note 70 (discussing convictions of a former KPMG executive and PCAOB employee). 
 84. See Jonathan Weil, Nine are Charged in KPMG Case on Tax Shelters, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
30, 2005), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112533172910025699 [https://perma.cc/7Z54-6BJ7] 
(“Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said the Justice Department weighed ‘collateral 
consequences’ in deciding not to indict KPMG . . . .”). 
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regulators’ negotiating leverage. Further, by taking the death penalty 
off the table, regulators cannot bring charges that may be deserved.  
In sum, there are reasons to expect suboptimal government 
regulation of accounting firms. First, regulatory capture can impede 
regulatory effectiveness. Second, through lobbying, accounting firms 
have thwarted policies that would have theoretically induced higher-
quality audits. Third, regulators are handicapped in imposing 
penalties, as they do not want to reduce the Big Four to the Big Three.  
2. Private Enforcement 
Private enforcement, which could come in the form of litigation, 
shareholder voting, and/or termination, is also unlikely to be an 
effective deterrent. First, it is unclear whether litigation risk improves 
audit quality. Further, even if it does improve audit quality, auditors’ 
litigation risk has declined significantly over the past two decades. 
Second, shareholders are unlikely to provide meaningful input on the 
company’s auditor unless they have additional information that, under 
the current regime, is not provided. Third, issuers face such significant 
costs for terminating an auditor that termination is an infrequent 
event—thus limiting the incentive created by this threat. 
a. Litigation Against Audit Firms 
Empirical literature is mixed on whether litigation risk serves 
to improve audit quality. There is a consensus that auditors mitigate 
litigation risk by, for example, charging higher fees and issuing more 
going-concern opinions,85 but it is unclear that these strategies improve 
audit quality. Increased audit fees could be consistent with greater 
effort or with auditor rents. Similarly, an increase in going-concern 
opinions could be consistent with increased audit quality and greater 
conservativism, or with increased risk aversion to the detriment of 
accuracy. 
Further, even if we believe that litigation risk improves audit 
quality, litigation is no longer the threat it once was. Shareholder 
litigation has traditionally represented the biggest litigation risk for 
 
 85. If the auditor has substantial doubt that the issuer will continue to survive in the future 
(defined as the following year), the auditor must issue a “going-concern qualification” indicating 
that the auditor questions the company’s ability to continue as an operating company. For an 
overview of research on the relationship between litigation risk and audit quality, see DeFond & 
Zhang, supra note 39. 
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auditors. However, shareholder litigation against auditors has declined 
significantly over the past decades.86 
Figure 2, below, shows the number of shareholder class action 
lawsuits against auditor defendants over each three-year period from 
1996 through 2016 (the data end in June 2016), along with the 
proportion of those defendants from the “Big Four/Five” accounting 
firms.87 Only litigation brought by shareholders in federal court 
alleging violations of federal law is included.88 
 
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS 
AGAINST AUDITOR DEFENDANTS, 1996 TO 2016 
  
As shown, the frequency of litigation filings has declined since 
its peak at the turn of the century, especially against the biggest 
accounting firms. Shareholders brought only twenty-eight class actions 
against auditors from 2012 to June 2016, and most of these auditor 
defendants were non–Big Four.  
 
 86. See Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 30 (finding a decline in Rule 10b-5 liability 
exposure for auditors since the PLSRA and particularly following Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First 
Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), even after controlling for changes in audit quality). 
 87. The Big Four audit firms include PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, 
and Ernst & Young. Prior to its demise, Arthur Andersen was part of this select clique (known as 
the “Big Five”). The figure includes Arthur Andersen in the years prior to its demise. 
 88. Shareholder litigation against auditors occurs almost exclusively in federal courts under 
federal securities laws. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver 
Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1067–68 (2018). As noted above, common law notions of 
privity prevent shareholder litigation against auditors in most states, and federal law requires 
that most class action lawsuits brought under federal securities laws must be in federal court. 
Honigsberg et al., supra note 26. 
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Figures 3 and 4 examine other important trends in litigation 
against auditors: dismissal rates and settlement values. Figure 3 shows 
that, as a percentage of the number of lawsuits alleging a violation of 
Rule 10b-5, dismissals of those claims have increased (where dismissals 
are defined as a dismissal of a Rule 10b-5 claim with prejudice or a 
dismissal without prejudice but the plaintiff declines to amend). For 
summary purposes, Figure 3 presents average dismissal rates over each 
three-year period.  
 
FIGURE 3: DISMISSAL RATES FOR RULE 10b-5 CLAIMS BROUGHT BY 
SHAREHOLDERS AGAINST AUDITORS, 1996 TO 2016 
 
Figure 4 presents settlement values over each three-year period. 
Total payouts are presented as black bars, and the auditor payout as a 
percentage of the total payout by all defendants is presented as a dotted 
line (note that some cases in the final time periods remain ongoing). In 
terms of total payouts, settlements peaked at the turn of the century 
and have significantly declined thereafter. Relative to total payouts by 
defendants in the same cases, auditor settlements were highest in 
1996–1998 (17%) and have remained relatively constant since (5%–7%). 
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FIGURE 4: SETTLEMENT VALUES IN CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS AGAINST 
AUDITORS, 1996 TO 2016 
 
One explanation for the decline in auditor litigation is that audit 
quality has improved—that is, perhaps auditors perform better and 
there are fewer reasons to sue them. However, further analysis shows 
that the decline is robust to controls for improvements in audit quality. 
For example, the most consistently significant determinant for 
successful litigation against auditors is whether there is a 
restatement.89 However, over the period from 2002 to 2016, auditors 
became less likely to be sued following a severe restatement (defined as 
a restatement of 10% or more of net income).90 As such, although audit 
quality may be a factor, it cannot explain the decline in full. 
There are other possible explanations for the decline.91 One 
explanation that I offered in prior work is the Supreme Court’s 
narrowing of secondary actor liability. Indeed, the decline in litigation 
 
 89. Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5: Empirical 
Analysis and Behavioral Implications, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 441, 484–86 (2012). 
 90. See Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 29 (finding a decline in the likelihood that auditors 
will face lawsuits following severe restatements between 2002 and 2016). 
 91. One possible explanation is that plaintiffs were less likely to have the benefit of an SEC 
enforcement action to help with pleading because the SEC brought fewer auditing-related 
enforcement actions after the creation of the PCAOB. Another possible explanation is that a 
reduction in auditor-provided nonaudit services hampered plaintiffs’ ability to plead scienter. See 
Jamie J. Schmidt, Perceived Auditor Independence and Audit Litigation: The Role of Nonaudit 
Services Fees, 87 ACCT. REV. 1033, 1060 (2012). 
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following a restatement is largely driven by the years following Janus,92 
an empirical trend consistent with the legal effects of Janus.  
Prior to Janus, the law stated that auditors needed to “make” a 
statement to be liable as a primary actor under Rule 10b-5, but circuits 
disagreed on what it meant to make a statement.93 Some circuits 
imposed a strict requirement that the auditor make the false or 
misleading statement, but other circuits allowed the auditor to be liable 
for the issuer’s misconduct if the auditor had “substantially assisted” 
the issuer’s misconduct by, for example, proposing accounting 
treatments.94 In essence, the circuits differed on whether plaintiffs had 
to meet each element of Rule 10b-5 based entirely on the audit report 
(relatively boilerplate language stating that the auditor reviewed the 
company’s financials and found them to be in compliance), or whether 
plaintiffs could rely on other aspects of the auditor’s behavior in stating 
a claim.95  
In Janus, the Court endorsed an auditor-friendly requirement 
that an actor must have “ultimate authority” over a statement to 
“make” the statement and therefore be subject to primary liability.96 As 
a practical matter, this means shareholders suing auditors under Rule 
10b-5 will have to state a claim based on the audit report alone97—a 
significant uphill battle for plaintiffs, who tend to have difficulty 
alleging elements such as scienter based solely on the audit report.98  
 
 92. See Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 29 (“[T]he likelihood the auditor will be sued is 
roughly two percentage points lower following Janus.”). 
 93. Browning Jeffries, The Implications of Janus on Issuer Liability in Jurisdictions Rejecting 
Collective Scienter, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 491, 499–509 (2013). 
 94. See Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 15–16. The Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits generally followed the “bright-line” standard (the more stringent standard), but 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits followed the “substantial participation” test (the looser standard). 
Id. 
 95. See id. (noting differences between tests applied among circuits, namely whether 
plaintiffs were required to demonstrate 10b-5 liability solely from the audit report or whether 
plaintiffs could point to an auditor’s “substantial participation” in the fraud). 
      96.    Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011). 
 97. In a review of cases in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits filed post-Dura and pre-Janus and 
alleging the auditor violated Rule 10b-5, more than half alleged that the auditor was liable based 
on its substantial participation in the issuer’s misstatement (these are the two circuits that 
allowed evidence of the auditor’s substantial participation to be considered). By contrast, in the 
five years after Janus, all complaints argued the auditor was liable based solely on the audit 
report. 
 98. See Scott v. ZST Dig. Networks, Inc., No. CV 11-03531 GAF, 2012 WL 538279 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 14, 2012). ZST Digital Networks was required to file financial statements with U.S. and 
Chinese securities regulators. The filings were vastly different; ZST showed a profit in the U.S. 
filings and a loss in the Chinese filings. The differences extended beyond different accounting rules 
in place in the different countries to reflect differences in the business fundamentals. Despite the 
plaintiff’s arguments that the auditor was reckless in providing a clean audit opinion in the U.S. 
filings when the Chinese filings were vastly different, the court declined to find that the plaintiff 
had properly pled scienter. 
4. Honigsberg(Do Not Delete) 11/16/2019  12:48 PM 
1896 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:6:1871 
In sum, it appears unlikely that litigation risk will provide the 
incentive necessary to induce optimal audit quality. Even if litigation 
risk improves audit quality, the Court’s narrowing of secondary actor 
liability under Rule 10b-5 has greatly reduced litigation risk for 
auditors. 
b. Shareholder Voting 
Another source of private enforcement, shareholder voting, is 
also unlikely to serve as a significant deterrent. As described earlier, 
shareholders rarely decline to ratify the auditor. This reflects the classic 
problem of rational apathy. The cost to shareholders of engaging in the 
fact-finding necessary to oppose an auditor far exceeds the benefit. 
After all, the benefit is opaque; there is no guarantee that management 
will switch auditors even if a nontrivial number of shareholders do not 
vote to ratify the auditor.99 And the costs are high, as critical 
information necessary for shareholders to make an informed decision is 
unavailable and/or not easily accessible. 
At present, the audit report—which contains the most widely 
accessible information on the audit—contains limited detail on how 
that audit was conducted.100 Without crucial information pertaining to 
the design of the audit, the treatment of critical accounting judgments, 
the auditor’s disciplinary history, and the communications between the 
auditor and the audit committee, shareholders cannot provide an 
informed check on the auditor’s conduct. Thus, it is not surprising that 
these votes are considered uninformed and lack influence. 
 
 99. For example, shareholders at Imperial Holdings did not vote to ratify the auditor (52.71% 
of votes were cast against ratification). Yet, Imperial retained the auditor. John Pakaluk, Auditor 
Ratification: An Overview of Russell 3000 Companies, AUDIT ANALYTICS (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://blog.auditanalytics.com/auditor-ratification-an-overview-of-russell-3000-companies/ 
[https://perma.cc/6XNQ-WKY7]. Similarly, Big Lots, Inc., Healthwarehouse.com, and Immersion 
Corp. all retained their auditors after more than 40% of shareholders voted against auditor 
ratification. McKeon, supra note 34. 
 100. The audit report is essentially a pass/fail system. Although it can be unqualified, 
qualified, or unqualified with explanatory language, it is typically unqualified with no additional 
language (i.e., the company receives a “pass”). From January 1, 2002, through February 20, 2019, 
Audit Analytics indicated that roughly 85% of all audit opinions issued to U.S.-based companies 
were unqualified without additional explanatory paragraphs (this percentage rises to over 99% for 
S&P 500 companies). In an attempt to provide more feedback to investors, the PCAOB recently 
adopted a new rule to mandate disclosures of critical accounting matters. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING 
OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE NO. 2017-001, THE AUDITOR’S REPORT ON AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS WHEN THE AUDITOR EXPRESSES AN UNQUALIFIED OPINION AND RELATED 
AMENDMENTS TO PCAOB STANDARDS (2017), https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket034/2017-
001-auditors-report-final-rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/49B2-7WXX]. 
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c. Termination 
Finally, the last source of private enforcement, termination, is 
unlikely to induce auditors to act with optimal levels of care. Auditor 
termination is infrequent,101 and it is a very costly event for the issuer. 
To see why, consider the reasons below.  
First, auditor turnover is a negative market signal. Issuers are 
notorious for firing their auditor to prevent the release of an 
undesirable audit opinion. Thus, investors often respond negatively to 
auditor turnover because they are concerned that the company changed 
its auditor to block the release of a damaging audit opinion.102 Reactions 
are particularly negative when a firm switches its auditor from a Big 
Four firm to a non–Big Four firm.103 Regulators, too, are aware that 
issuers fire auditors to prevent the release of damaging information, so 
they are more likely to investigate a company after auditor turnover. 
Thus, a company that wants to change its auditor must weigh the 
benefits of the change against the likely negative market reaction upon 
announcing the change and the increased possibility of regulatory 
scrutiny.104 This is not an attractive choice.  
Second, firm managers are often reluctant to switch auditors 
because the new auditor will be less familiar with their business and/or 
industry, which results in unnecessary cost, time, and effort to get the 
new auditor up to speed.105 Even if the new auditor is willing to provide 
 
      101.  Floyd Norris, Deep Secret: Why Auditors are Replaced, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/28/business/28norris.html [https://perma.cc/JR35-HYBT]. 
 102. John W. Eichenseher et al., Market Reaction to Auditor Changes by OTC Companies, 9 
AUDITING, 1989, at 29, 38–40; see also Dov Fried & Allen Schiff¸ CPA Switches and Associated 
Market Reactions, 56 ACCT. REV. 326, 338–39 (1981) (finding a correlation between auditor 
changes and negative market reactions).  
 103. Eichenseher et al., supra note 102, at 39 (finding a negative market response when a 
company moved away from a Big Eight firm). 
 104. See Eric R. Holzman et al., Who’s on the Hot Seat for an SEC Investigation and How Do 
They Respond? 18 (Feb. 21, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3223815 [https://perma.cc/Z6HC-M3ZF]. 
 105. Kemba J. Dunham, Firms that Want to Switch Auditors Find It Takes Time, Money and 
Faith, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2002), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1016150533124417920? 
[https://perma.cc/7BZQ-XTQ8]. As an example, consider General Electric (GE). Following 
significant cash flow issues, accounting probes, and massive layoffs, GE announced in 2018 that it 
would fire its CEO and that eight of its seventeen directors would retire. Nonetheless, even though 
only 65% of shareholders voted to ratify the auditor (one of the lowest levels of support in recent 
years), GE has, at present, retained KPMG (although it has opened the door to dismissing KPMG 
in the future). GE’s explanation for retaining KPMG was notable, as GE stated that it was 
important to maintain continuity with its auditor—despite that GE was apparently comfortable 
breaking continuity with its directors and CEO. Brendan Case, GE Opens Door to Replace KPMG 
as Auditor After Financial Miscues, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-14/ge-opens-door-to-replace-kpmg-as-auditor-
after-financial-miscues [https://perma.cc/Y32W-H94U]; Cydney Posner, Shareholder Vote on 
Auditors Puts the Heat on the Board, COOLEY PUBCO (Apr. 26, 2018), 
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the issuer with a significant discount as an incentive to switch, that 
switch is still going to be costly for the issuer because the new auditing 
team will require assistance and employee time to learn the company’s 
reporting systems and business. 
Finally, even assuming that a firm wants to switch its auditor, 
there are few options. A frequently cited benefit of the Big Four is that 
they have the expertise and structure to conduct audits of complex 
businesses.106 For an issuer who needs this expertise, there are likely to 
be fewer than four realistic options. First, due to SOX’s restrictions on 
the ability of audit firms to provide nonaudit services to their audit 
clients,107 managers will be unable to hire another Big Four firm if that 
firm provides it with certain nonaudit services.108 In recent years, the 
Big Four have significantly increased sales of nonaudit services to 
nonaudit clients—thus potentially preventing an issuer from hiring the 
firm as an auditor.109 Second, there is significant auditor concentration 
in certain industries. For example, Deloitte and Ernst & Young have 
historically audited 88% of the casino industry.110 
In sum, the risk of termination is unlikely to induce auditors to 
conduct high-quality audits. Firing an auditor leads to substantial costs 
for the issuer, so audit committees are hesitant to do so. Auditors, of 
course, know the audit committee will be reluctant to fire them, thus 
mitigating the incentive that would otherwise arise from the risk of 
termination.  
 
https://cooleypubco.com/2018/04/26/shareholder-vote-on-auditors-puts-heat-on-board/ 
[https://perma.cc/R59G-G39A]; Michael Rapoport, KPMG Gets Cold Shoulder From GE 
Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kpmg-follows-pwc-in-
adding-independent-directors-to-its-board-1524680342? [https://perma.cc/5NQV-AQLT]. 
 106. Chih-Liang Liu & Shu-Miao Lai, Organizational Complexity and Auditor Quality, 20 
CORP. GOVERNANCE 352, 353, 365–66 (2012); see also Dunham, supra note 105 (arguing that firms 
are reluctant to switch auditors as the new auditors will be less accustomed to their business and 
have less industry expertise). 
 107. Thomas L. Riesenberg, The Non-Audit Restrictions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, D.G. 
MCDERMOTT ASSOCS. (Sept. 24, 2002), https://www.dgm.com/information-center/sarbanes-oxley-
information/non-audit-service-restrictions-of-the-sarbanes-oxley-act-article 
[https://perma.cc/7FED-CLZA].  
 108. See Liz Loxton, How the Big Four Have Returned to Consulting with a Bang, 
ACCOUNTANCY AGE (Sept. 27, 2015), https://www.accountancyage.com/aa/feature/ 
2427739/feature-how-the-big-four-have-returned-to-consulting-with-a-bang 
[https://perma.cc/XS8E-F7K4]. 
 109. See Editorial, Maybe the Big Four Auditing Firms Do Need to Be Broken Up, BLOOMBERG 
(June 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-18/maybe-the-big-four-
auditing-firms-do-need-breaking-up [https://perma.cc/V9CM-84E8].  
 110. See, e.g., Special Report: Called to Account – The Future of Auditing, ECONOMIST (Nov. 
20, 2004), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2004/11/18/called-to-account 
[https://perma.cc/B8ND-RANW].  
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3. Reputational Risk 
Firm reputation risk likely provides the greatest incentive for 
auditors to provide high-quality audits. However, due to the 
aforementioned stickiness of the relationship between auditors and 
issuers—and the significant costs to terminate an auditor—there is 
significant reason to doubt that reputation risk provides market 
incentives to improve audit quality.  
Indeed, consistent with the high costs of terminating an auditor, 
U.S. issuers today do not fire Big Four auditors for standard audit 
failures, such as restatements.111 This means that reputational 
sanctions will not provide marginal incentives to improve audit quality, 
leading to suboptimal incentives for audit firms (and the partners who 
own those firms). Although partners at these firms are incentivized to 
avoid extreme bad behavior that could “kill” the firm, they are not 
incentivized to provide marginally better audit quality for purely 
business reasons. Instead, as described below in Part II.B, they are 
incentivized to focus on growth. 
B. Benefits of Individual Auditor Brands 
Individual accountability could provide a counterweight to the 
current incentive structure.112 First, as described earlier, audit partners 
do not internalize the full consequences of an audit failure. Promoting 
individual brands will better address this inefficiency and reduce 
externalities by causing audit partners to internalize these failures. 
Second, greater reliance on overseas participants has significantly 
changed audit design in a manner likely to increase risk and introduce 
coordination challenges. Prior research has indicated that holding a 
single person accountable could reduce this heightened risk.113 Third, 
there are significant differences in quality across audit partners, even 
among partners in the same firm. Providing this information to market 
participants would allow them to select better auditors. Finally, there 
is reason to believe that individual reputation markets could increase 
competition within the accounting industry.  
 
 111. See Kedia, Khan & Rajgopal, supra note 21, at 29 (describing how market share for U.S. 
auditors remains constant following routine audit failures). 
 112. Although 2018 saw renewed calls to break up the Big Four to increase competition, such 
dramatic action seems politically infeasible in the United States. For purposes of this Part, I 
assume the industry structure is fixed (except for any changes caused by increased accountability).  
 113. See infra Section II.B.2. 
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1. Reducing Externalities by Internalizing Failure 
In theory, market forces will penalize an underperforming firm, 
and the firm will then penalize the underperforming partner. Each 
partner will be properly incentivized to conduct high-quality audits for 
clients with acceptable levels of risk. However, as described earlier, 
clients do not leave Big Four auditors following standard audit failures, 
meaning that the market does not provide marginal deterrence 
incentives for an underperforming firm.  
Without market incentives to promote audit quality, the Big 
Four have rationally structured their compensation to promote 
retaining (and increasing) their client base.114 Although the exact 
compensation structure is not publicly available and varies by firm, 
research has concluded that compensation is driven primarily by the 
size of a partner’s clientele and/or the number of publicly traded 
clients.115 Attracting new clients is strongly related to an increase in 
compensation.116 In at least one of the Big Four, losing a client reduces 
compensation.117 
Given the financial incentives, a rational auditor will hesitate to 
push back strongly against her clients—and her firm will support her 
decision. Such incentives are consistent with observed behavior. 
Consider, for example, internal feedback reviews provided to a former 
Senior Manager at PricewaterhouseCoopers who became an SEC 
whistleblower.118 “I don’t think the way he develops his client 
relationships is very effective. He doesn’t trust any of his clients,” said 
one comment. This performance evaluation contrasts sharply with the 
Supreme Court’s view of an auditor’s role as a “public watchdog” that 
requires “total independence from the client at all times and requires 
complete fidelity to the public trust.”119 
Also consistent with these incentives are the repeated instances 
in which auditors have assisted clients with the creation of the financial 
statements—and then audited those same financials. Independence 
rules prohibit this practice,120 as it amounts to the auditor auditing 
himself. Although difficult to identify, such violations of independence 
 
 114. Knechel et al., supra note 52.  
 115. Id. at 383. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 384. 
 118. David S. Hilzenrath, PwC Whistleblower Alleges Fraud in Audits of Silicon Valley 
Companies, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2018/05/pwc-whistleblower-alleges-fraud-in-audits-of-silicon-
valley-companies/ [https://perma.cc/NT3A-NMTT].  
 119. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984). 
 120. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2012).  
4. Honigsberg(Do Not Delete) 11/16/2019  12:48 PM 
2019] INDIVIDUAL AUDIT PARTNER ACCOUNTABILITY 1901 
have been revealed through litigation,121 PCAOB inspections,122 SEC 
enforcement actions,123 and whistleblowers.124 These anecdotes 
contradict the image of a skeptical professional seeking to serve the 
investors’ interests but are entirely consistent with the incentive 
structure. Audit partners receive a disproportionate share of the 
financial benefits paid by a client but share the costs of an audit failure 
with their firm (or, at least, the office of their firm).  
Promoting individual auditor brands will cause partners to 
internalize these failures. As described previously, there are robust 
reputation markets in many areas of capital markets, and these 
markets provide strong incentives to avoid accounting failures. As 
applied to audit partners, who frequently enjoy careers as high-level 
corporate managers or directors after making partner,125 we would 
expect a similar effect: these auditors will work harder to avoid 
reputational harm because their reputation is a valuable asset. Not only 
is the auditor’s reputation valuable while he remains at the accounting 
firm, where clients must agree to hire him, but it is valuable following 
 
 121. See In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 230 F. Supp. 2d 152, 152, 158–59 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(finding “clean” audits issued by defendant for financial statements it also helped prepare 
contained material misrepresentations); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 433 
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (determining facts were sufficient to support an inference that defendant misstated 
financial information in a Prospectus it had a central role in developing and further concealed the 
information in a later audit). Even auditors who do not prepare statements may overstep their role 
as auditors by suggesting accounting treatments. See, e.g., In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 
322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. 
Cal. 1994) (discussing plaintiffs’ claims that the auditor materially assisted in the preparation of 
misstated financial statements). 
 122. See, e.g., News Release, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., PCAOB Fines Deloitte 
Canada $350,000 for Failing to Maintain Independence Over Three Consecutive Audits (Oct. 16, 
2008), https://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/PCAOB-Fines-Deloitte-Canada-$350,000.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/74DY-KRGZ] (discussing a PCAOB investigation which uncovered that one 
Deloitte branch had audited financial statements that another related branch created). 
      123.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges PwC LLP With 
Violating Auditor Independence Rules and Engaging in Improper Professional Conduct (Sept. 23, 
2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-184 [https://perma.cc/6DJB-FPLN] 
(discussing an SEC enforcement action against an auditor at PwC who violated independence rules 
by providing certain nonaudit services that assisted in the audit process). 
 124. See, e.g., Hilzenrath, supra note 118 (detailing an account submitted to the SEC by a 
former auditor that alleged his former accounting firm compromised ethical standards by 
overstepping independence rules). 
 125. For example, one study found that 6% of audit committee members are public accounting 
experts, and 14% of audit committee chairs have public accounting experience. John L. Abernathy 
et al., The Association Between Characteristics of Audit Committee Accounting Experts, Audit 
Committee Chairs, and Financial Reporting Timeliness, 30 ADVANCES ACCT. 283, 289 (2014). 
Although SOX requires a one-year cooling off period before an auditor can work for a client in a 
financial reporting oversight role, auditors can work for a different industry client with no cooling-
off period. Further, even with the one-year cooling-off period, auditors may return to those clients 
later in their careers. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(2) (2019). 
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his tenure as an auditor for other prestigious employment 
opportunities.126  
Forcing the auditor to build a brand that is separate from that 
of her firm will force individual audit partners to publicly internalize 
the costs of audit failure. This will provide strong incentives to avoid 
such failure, as auditors will be incentivized to maintain a high-quality 
reputation both during their tenure at the accounting firm and beyond.  
2. Improved Audit Quality 
A second benefit to individual reputation markets for auditors is 
that accountability frequently improves outcomes, particularly in 
circumstances requiring coordination challenges.127 Such intuition is 
why, for example, SOX requires the CEO and CFO to sign that they are 
directly responsible for the accuracy of the financial reporting and the 
quality of the internal controls. To date, there is evidence that this 
signature requirement has been effective; 68% of practicing auditors 
stated that they believe it has improved reporting integrity.128 
Regarding auditing specifically, prior work shows that 
accountability reduces auditors’ information biases and enhances effort 
 
 126. Although it is possible that a focus on individual brands will change demand, leading 
firms to change their compensation structure, such a change is tenuous. More importantly, it is 
unnecessary to improve incentive-alignment. Lucrative opportunities outside traditional 
accounting provide Big Four partners with financial incentives to avoid public association with 
audit failure, regardless of internal compensation policies.  
 127. See Barry R. Schlenker et al., The Triangle Model of Responsibility, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 
632, 634 (1994) (hypothesizing that accountability is a social mechanism of control where 
collectively set prescriptions of conduct can be judged and then rewarded or punished accordingly); 
see also Marceline B. R. Kroon, Paul’t Hart & Dik van Kreveld, Managing Group Decision Making 
Processes: Individual Versus Collective Accountability and Groupthink, 2 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 
91, 108 (1991) (finding that participants held individually accountable were more likely to make 
better decisions than those held collectively accountable).  
 128. Jeffrey Cohen, Ganesh Krishnamoorthy & Arnie Wright, Corporate Governance in the 
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Era: Auditors’ Experiences, 27 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES., 751, 771 (2010). 
Additional work finds that earnings management decreased following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but 
these studies cannot identify the specific effect of the signature requirement, as they cannot 
empirically distinguish the effects of the different provisions that went into effect simultaneously. 
See, e.g., Gerald Lobo & Jian Zhou, Did Conservatism in Financial Reporting Increase After the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial Evidence, 20 ACCT. HORIZONS 57, 67–68 (2006) (finding a decrease in 
earnings management following the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
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and consensus.129 There is also some evidence that it improves audit 
documentation.130  
The incentive effects of individual accountability are 
particularly important given the changes in audit design over the past 
decade. Auditors today frequently rely on overseas auditors, where the 
overseas auditors are termed either “component” auditors or “offshore” 
auditors. For multinational firms, presumably over half of audit hours 
are frequently performed overseas. As described below, this increase in 
overseas auditors imposes coordination challenges that increase the 
risk of audit failure. 
a. Component Auditors 
Component auditors are foreign affiliates of the lead accounting 
firm that audit the issuer’s international operations. The affiliates may 
share the same name as the U.S. auditor (for example, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers France) but need not. The lead auditor 
generally relies on the same underlying component auditor(s) from year 
to year, but there can be variation.  
Typically, multinational firms have more than one component 
auditor, and the number of hours performed by each component varies 
significantly. As shown in Table 1, the firms that disclose the use of 
component auditors in Form AP have, on average, 4.69 audit 
participants. Of those, 2.95 participants perform less than 5% of audit 
hours and 1.75 perform more than 5% of audit hours. At the extreme, 
one firm used sixty-five audit participants. On average, these 
component auditors perform 29% of total audit hours. At the extreme, 
 
 129. See Joseph F. Brazel, Christopher P. Agoglia & Richard C. Hatfield, Electronic Versus 
Face-to-Face Review: The Effects of Alternative Forms of Review on Auditors’ Performance, 79 
ACCT. REV. 949, 953–54 (2004) (finding that test subjects held accountable for their work during 
face-to-face review, as opposed to e-review, prepared work papers which exhibited higher judgment 
quality and reflected increased effort in comprehensive evaluation of the evidence); Todd DeZoort, 
Paul Harrison & Mark Taylor, Accountability and Auditors’ Materiality Judgements: The Effects 
of Differential Pressure Strength on Conservatism, Variability, and Effort, 31 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 
373, 383 (2006) (finding that auditors in an experiment exerted more effort, as measured by time 
spent and explanation length, in their auditing task when they were under higher accountability 
pressure); Jane Kennedy, Debiasing Audit Judgment with Accountability: A Framework and 
Experimental Results, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 231, 240 (1993) (finding that test subjects who were 
informed they would be held accountable for their decisionmaking prior to receiving 
positive/negative sequential information exhibited no recency bias, in contrast to subjects who 
were held not accountable or post-accountable).  
 130. See H. THOMAS JOHNSON & ROBERT S. KAPLAN, RELEVANCE LOST: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 12–13 (1987). 
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one firm used component auditors for 100% of audit hours (this issuer 
is not based in the United States).131 
 
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE USE OF COMPONENT 
AUDITORS, AS DISCLOSED IN FORM AP 
  
  
Number of 
Component 
Auditors 
Performing 
Less than 
5% of Total 
Audit Hours 
(Total) 
Number of 
Component 
Auditors 
Performing 
Greater than 
5% of Total 
Audit Hours 
(Total) 
Number of 
Component 
Auditors 
(Total) 
Estimated 
Component 
Auditor 
Hours (% of 
Total Audit 
Hours) 
Mean 2.95 1.75 4.69 29% 
Median 1 1 3 25% 
Minimum 0 1 1 1% 
Maximum 63 7 65 100% 
 
Research on component auditors is limited, presumably because 
information on their use was largely unavailable until recently.132 
However, the initial studies provide reason to believe that greater use 
of component auditors is positively associated with audit failures. For 
example, using private data from the PCAOB, Professors Denise 
Downey and Jean Bedard show that misstatements are generally 
higher for engagements with greater foreign auditor participation.133 
Similarly, another team of researchers found that issuers with 
significant reliance on component auditors have lower audit quality 
than a matched sample of issuers—and that the market responds 
negatively to the disclosure of these component auditors.134 
 
 131. Table 1 includes the 1,347 issuers noting the use of component auditors in Form AP 
(current as of June, 2018). See generally PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., AUDITOR SEARCH, 
https://pcaobus.org/Pages/AuditorSearch.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/F9PD-
SDNQ] (providing a downloadable version of the data set, updated daily).  
 132. Historically, only minimal information on the use of other audit participants was 
disclosed on PCAOB Form 2. See PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., FORM 2 – ANNUAL REPORT 
FORM, https://pcaobus.org/Rules/Pages/Form_2.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/WN3E-Y9LL]. 
 133. See Denise H. Downey & Jean C. Bedard, Do Use of Foreign Auditor Personnel and Lead 
Engagement Partner Incentives Affect Audit Quality for U.S. Multinational Companies? (2019) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 134. See Carol Callaway Dee, Ayalew Lulseged & Tianming Zhang, Who Did the Audit? Audit 
Quality and Disclosures of Other Audit Participants in PCAOB Filings, 90 ACCT. REV. 1939, 1962 
(2015) (finding that issuers for which auditors disclosed the use of other participants in Form 2 
had lower audit quality than a matched group of issuers); see also Juan Mao, Michael Ettredge & 
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It is not difficult to imagine that the use of component auditors 
could cause audit quality to decrease.135 The lead engagement partner 
is responsible for supervising all component auditors and integrating 
their work product, and the scrutiny applied to the component auditors 
varies wildly.136 For example, some countries will not allow work papers 
created by the component auditor to be removed from the country.137 In 
such instances, some U.S. engagement partners will insist on 
 
Mary S. Stone, Group Audits: Are Audit Quality and Price Associated with the Lead Auditor’s 
Decision to Accept Responsibility? 29 (July 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(finding that lead auditors accepting responsibility for work done by other auditors charge higher 
audit fees but provide the same or lower quality audits). 
 135. For two reasons, reliance on Chinese component auditors has received the most attention. 
First, Chinese auditors are considered notoriously problematic. This is true even for affiliates of 
respected U.S. accounting firms. For example, consider China-Biotics Inc., an audit client of BDO 
Limited (a Hong-Kong based affiliate of US-based BDO Seidman). When comparing the financials 
filed with the U.S. SEC with those filed with the SEC’s Chinese counterpart, the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”), the numbers are not even in the same 
ballpark. China-Biotics Inc. reported revenue of $42.3 million in its 2008 financials filed with the 
SEC but only $0.5 million in its SAIC financials for the same year. Chinese Company Analyst, 
Orient Paper: Not All BDOs Are the Same, SEEKING ALPHA (July 6, 2010), 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/213213-orient-paper-not-all-bdos-are-the-same?page=4 
[https://perma.cc/T9KA-6LSK]. Net income was negative in the filings provided to the SAIC, but 
positive $17.5 million in the filings provided to the SEC. Id. Without the company name, no reader 
would think these filings represented the same company. China’s refusal to allow PCAOB 
inspections has only fueled the concerns regarding audit quality in China. Second, many U.S. firms 
have substantial audit operations in China, meaning that a misstatement of the Chinese portion 
of the audit would likely be material. As an example, consider Walmart’s 2018 audit. Anywhere 
from 35 to 70% of the audit hours were performed by component auditors, with Ernst & Young 
Hua Ming LLP in Beijing performing 10 to 20% of the work. A significant misstatement of the 
Chinese portion of the audit would be material to the whole audit. For media coverage, see, for 
example, Michael Rapoport, The Chinese Blind Spot in U.S. Companies’ Financials, WALL ST. J. 
(July 21, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-chinese-blind-spot-in-u-s-companies-financials-
1532170801 [https://perma.cc/6CDK-XYFV]. For discussions of Chinese auditors, see, for example, 
Ferdinand A. Gul, Andy Y. Ng & Marian Yew Jen Wu Tong, Chinese Auditors’ Ethical Behavior in 
an Audit Conflict Situation, 42 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 379–80 (2003); Issuers that Are Audit Clients 
of PCAOB-Registered Firms from Non-U.S. Jurisdictions Where the PCAOB Is Denied Access to 
Conduct Inspections, PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD. (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://pcaobus.org/International/Inspections/Pages/ 
IssuerClientsWithoutAccess.aspx [https://perma.cc/N8GV-JBPD]. 
 136. See Denise Hanes Downey & Jean C. Bedard, Coordination and Communication 
Challenges in Global Group Audits, 38 AUDITING, Feb. 2019, at 123, 127–30 (providing an overview 
of the communication techniques used for group audits); see also Dan Sunderland & Gregory M. 
Trompeter, Multinational Group Audits: Problems Faced in Practice and Opportunities for 
Research, 36 AUDITING, Aug. 2017, at 159, 164 (commenting on barriers between the group and 
component auditors, such as distance, language, and customs, along with limitations which 
prevent the group auditor from controlling assignments and level of supervision for component 
auditors).  
 137. For example, the Chinese government restricts audit documentation from leaving the 
country. See Jay Clayton, Wes Bricker & William D. Duhnke III, Statement on the Vital Role of 
Audit Quality and Regulatory Access to Audit and Other Information Internationally—Discussion 
of Current Information Access Challenges with Respect to U.S.-listed Companies with Significant 
Operations in China, SEC (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-
vital-role-audit-quality-and-regulatory-access-audit-and-other [https://perma.cc/S8M3-L4YW]. 
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embedding one or more members of the U.S. team with the component 
auditor to allow the U.S. team to monitor the component. However, 
other U.S. engagement partners may simply take the component 
auditor at its word that the numbers supplied by management are 
materially free from inaccuracies.138  
b. Offshore Auditors 
Audit work is also performed overseas by “offshore” auditors. In 
response to financial pressure to cut costs following the recent financial 
crisis, accounting firms started sending more and more work to 
“offshore auditors,” meaning that the lead auditor delegates work to the 
firm’s offices located outside the lead auditor’s country of headquarters. 
Estimates suggest that offshore auditors perform 10 to 20% of audit 
hours.139 Offshoring differs from the use of component auditors because 
the offshore auditors assist in the work of the lead auditor rather than 
audit the issuer’s international operations. Further, unlike the work of 
component auditors, work sent to offshore centers is typically not 
disclosed. These centers are frequently part of the U.S. firm, so sending 
work to these centers does not count as sending work to a foreign 
affiliate.140 
Commentators have expressed concern that offshoring audit 
work may lead to any number of negative outcomes, ranging from a 
deterioration in audit quality to data and privacy issues.141 However, 
proponents of audit offshoring have touted its efficiency and pointed to 
its potential benefits; for example, by offshoring dredge work, U.S. team 
members can focus on more nuanced accounting issues. 
There is limited empirical evidence on the effects of audit 
offshoring, likely due to the lack of data availability. The only 
 
 138. See Sunderland & Trompeter, supra note 136, at 164. 
 139. See Mignon Farnet, Globalization and Offshoring: The Effects of a Globalized Workplace 
on Auditing Procedures 48 (May 2016) (unpublished B.S. capstone project, Syracuse University 
Honors Program), https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone/974/?utm_source=surface.syr.edu%2 
Fhonors_capstone%2F974&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages 
[https://perma.cc/YTR4-M2SV] (estimating that approximately 10% of work is offshored); Dena 
Aubin & Sumeet Chatterjee, Analysis: As More U.S. Audit Work Moves to India, Concerns Arise, 
REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-audit-india/analysis-as-more-u-s-
audit-work-moves-to-india-concerns-arise-idUSBRE89F1GC20121016 [https://perma.cc/USH5-
VX62] (“PwC’s goal is to send about 20 percent of audit work to the delivery centers, said the firm’s 
global chairman, Dennis Nally.”).  
 140. For example, Deloitte India is a region within the Deloitte U.S. organization. See Our 
Offices, DELOITTE., https://www2.deloitte.com/ui/en/footerlinks/office-locator.html# (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/KX2E-DL9R]. 
 141. See Tammy Whitehouse, Offshored External Audits Expose Regulatory Issues, 
COMPLIANCE WK. (Apr. 1, 2009), https://www.complianceweek.com/offshored-external-audits-
expose-regulatory-issues/5228.article [https://perma.cc/7RCA-Q6NM].  
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significant work studying audit offshoring has bypassed the lack of data 
availability by conducting interviews and/or experimental research.142 
These studies typically suggest that offshoring lowers audit quality—
or, more precisely, that market participants believe it does. For 
example, two experimental studies have provided evidence that “jurors” 
(that is, experimental participants who were asked to play the role of 
jurors for the experiment) perceive outsourced audit work to be of lower 
quality and were more likely to award greater damages when work was 
performed offshore.143 
In sum, auditing has changed significantly in ways that seem 
likely to increase the risk of audit failure. Solutions designed to induce 
high-quality audits need to consider these changes in audit design. One 
such solution is increased individual accountability, which prior 
research suggests can reduce coordination challenges and mitigate the 
risk of audit failure by reducing auditors’ information biases and 
enhancing auditors’ effort and consensus.  
3. Market Participant Incentives 
Finally, a third benefit to individual auditor accountability is 
that market participants will have better information when selecting 
an auditor. There are significant differences in quality among audit 
partners, even partners within the same firm. Providing this 
information to the market will allow for more informed auditor 
selection.  
a. Heterogeneity in Audit Partner Quality 
Significant research shows that audit partners differ in quality. 
Most of these studies are international, as partner identities were not 
disclosed in the United States until recently. However, some U.S.-based 
research finds consistent results, suggesting that the international 
studies translate to the U.S. setting. 
 
 142. See Denise Hanes Downey, An Exploration of Offshoring in Audit Practice and the 
Potential Consequences of Associated Work “Redesign” on Auditor Performance, 37 AUDITING, May 
2018, at 197, 202, 209 (examining offshore auditing by interviewing six different auditors with 
varying experience and completing an experiment to measure work design issues present in 
offshore auditing); Alex Lyubimov, Vicky Arnold & Steve G. Sutton, An Examination of the Legal 
Liability Associated with Outsourcing and Offshoring Audit Procedures, 32 AUDITING, May 2013, 
at 97 (conducting an experiment which measured jurors’ perceptions of auditor liability after an 
audit failure for insource, outsource, onshore, and offshore work). 
 143. Brian Daughtery, Denise Dickins & M. G. Fennema, The Effects of Offshoring Audit Tasks 
on Jurors’ Evaluations of Damage Awards Against Auditors, in 16 ADVANCES IN ACCT. BEHAV. 
RES. 55, 73 (Donna Bobek Schmitt ed., 2013); Lyubimov, Arnold & Sutton, supra note 142, at 115. 
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In particular, research has found that certain partners are 
significantly more likely to be associated with negative accounting 
events, such as restatements. For example, using Taiwanese data, one 
study found that the likelihood of poor audit quality is higher when the 
engagement partner has a recent history of poor audit quality, holding 
observable client risk characteristics constant. Similar results have 
been found using data from other countries.144 For example, researchers 
using Swedish data found that audit characteristics, such as 
aggressiveness and conservatism, persist over time and are highly 
correlated across audits led by the same partner. The authors conclude 
that “[a]uditor aggressive or conservative reporting is a systematic 
audit partner attribute and not randomly distributed across 
engagements.”145 
Within the United States, data limitations have led studies to 
focus on forced turnovers146 rather than time-series analyses.147 
Securities law requires that lead audit partners rotate off an audit 
engagement for an SEC registrant after five years,148 so several studies 
examine accounting quality when the new auditor comes on board. For 
example, Professors Laurion, Lawrence, and Ryan identified 
mandatory partner rotations using SEC comment letters, and they 
found evidence of increases in restatements and deferred tax valuation 
allowances following partner rotations.149 Professors Gipper, Hail, and 
Leuz similarly examine changes in audit quality following a rotation, 
but they obtain private PCAOB data, allowing for a much larger 
sample.150 They find a higher likelihood that the auditor issues an 
 
 144. Knechel, Vanstraelen & Zerni, supra note 52 (finding variation using Swedish data). For 
studies using Chinese data, see Ferdinand A. Gul, Donghui Wu & Zhifeng Yang, Do Individual 
Auditors Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from Archival Data, 88 ACCT. REV. 1993 (2013) and Xiaoke 
Wang et al., Engagement Audit Partner Experience and Audit Quality, 3 CHINA J. OF ACCT. STUD., 
no. 3, 2015, at 230. 
 145. W. Robert Knechel, Ann Vanstraelen & Mikko Zerni, Does the Identity of Engagement 
Partners Matter? An Analysis of Audit Partner Reporting Decisions, 32 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1443, 
1473 (2015). 
 146. In addition to studies on mandatory auditor rotations under securities laws, one study 
examines clients required to switch to new accounting firms after the demise of Arthur Andersen 
and finds these firms were much more likely to restate earnings, further suggesting variation in 
auditors. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive is Corporate Fraud? 4 
(Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2222608, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2222608 [https://perma.cc/B2JV-C53K]. 
 147. Time-series analysis examines the same observations at successive times (e.g., the same 
firms in different years).  
 148. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (2012). 
 149. Henry Laurion, Alastair Lawrence & James P. Ryans, U.S. Audit Partner Rotations, 92 
ACCT. REV., May 2019, at 209, 232. 
 150. Brandon Gipper, Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, On the Economics of Audit Partner Tenure 
and Rotation: Evidence from PCAOB Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
w24018, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023725 
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internal control weakness.151 There are two explanations for the 
increase in accounting-related issues when a new partner arrives. First, 
the incoming partner may identify additional issues undetected by the 
prior partner. Second, the incoming partner may not be comfortable 
with the accounting interpretations accepted by the prior partner.152 
b. Market Participants 
If market participants such as audit committees and 
shareholders are provided with sufficient detail to identify the 
heterogeneity across individual auditors, they have strong incentives to 
use the information to select higher-quality auditors. 
Audit Committees. The audit committee is a subcommittee of 
the Board of Directors and is primarily responsible for providing 
oversight of the reporting process. Audit committee members have 
strong incentives to select high-quality auditors. First, they have a 
fiduciary duty to shareholders. Second, directors incur career-limiting 
reputational sanctions if they are associated with an audit failure.153 As 
noted previously, directors are more likely to depart a firm following 
earnings restatements or financial fraud. Finally, should the audit 
committee members make a poor selection, shareholders can, in theory, 
vote them out.154 In sum, out of self-preservation, audit committees 
 
[https://perma.cc/33WE-QJG8]. Note that this study failed to find other “fresh look” benefits of 
mandatory rotations. 
 151. Id. Internal controls are processes and procedures that induce high-quality financial 
reporting. Internal controls are abstract in theory, but they are intuitive in practice. Consider this 
common scenario: A controller receives an email that appears to be from a supplier, and the email 
requests that the controller send payment to a new routing number. The controller remits payment 
according to the instructions in the email, only to later learn that he has been defrauded. The 
email was not from the supplier, but from a bad actor who is now millions of dollars richer. Rather 
than simply wire millions of public-company dollars to a new account, the controller should have 
called the supplier to confirm the email’s legitimacy. And the failure to do so reflects an internal 
control weakness: either the company lacks procedures requiring verification of new accounts 
before making payments, or the company’s controller failed to follow those procedures. Either way, 
the company’s controls are problematic. See, e.g., AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, THE 
IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL CONTROL IN FINANCIAL REPORTING AND SAFEGUARDING PLAN ASSETS 4 
(2014), 
https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/interestareas/employeebenefitplanauditquality/resource
s/planadvisories/downloadabledocuments/plan-advisoryinternalcontrol-hires.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/62CB-V6GS]. 
 152. Of course, it is entirely possible that two partners are of identical quality but identify 
different accounting issues, leading to disclosure of accounting-related issues upon rotation. 
 153. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (describing the negative consequences of 
being associated with an audit failure). 
 154. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommended against audit 
committee members at Ryman Hospital Partners after these directors approved spending on 
nonaudit services that ISS deemed excessive. Geert De Lombaerde, Proxy Advisor Calls for ‘No’ 
Vote on Ryman Directors, E&Y, NASHVILLE POST (May 1, 2013), 
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have strong incentives to use all available information to select a high-
quality auditor.  
Shareholders. Shareholders, too, are likely to use the 
information. When picking stocks, they have strong incentives to avoid 
companies with low-quality accounting.155 Shareholders suffer 
significant losses upon disclosure of a restatement—far more than the 
value of the restatement itself.156 By obtaining information on the 
partner leading the audit, investors can better assess the financial risk 
of a company and price the stock accordingly. Indeed, an experimental 
study supports this view; the authors found that shareholders were less 
likely to select a peer firm audited by a partner who had overseen an 
audit failure.157 Knowing that investors rely on the information when 
purchasing a stock will provide even greater pressure on audit 
committees to select high-quality auditors.158  
In sum, there is ample reason to expect broader dissemination 
of information on the quality of individual auditors to reduce audit 
failures. It is clear that information on individual auditors is value-
relevant, and that auditors are not interchangeable. Shareholders and, 
especially, audit committee members have strong incentives to use this 
type of information.159  
4. Increased Competition 
Finally, auditor reputation markets could increase competition. 
The lack of competition in the upper echelon of accounting, where four 
 
https://www.nashvillepost.com/business/area-stocks/article/20469678/proxy-advisor-calls-for-no-
vote-on-ryman-directors-ey (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/U47R-4QDC]. 
 155. Even if the collection action problem leads investors to be rationally apathetic with regard 
to shareholder voting, it does not follow that an investor will neglect to conduct research before 
purchasing a stock. 
 156. See Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking 
the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581 (2008) (examining the financial impact on 
firms caught engaging in financial misrepresentation). The extreme negative market reaction to 
accounting failures contrasts with other negative events. For example, the loss in market value 
caused by other events (e.g., environmental fine) is similar to the cost of the fine. However, the loss 
in value caused by accounting failures is greater than the loss of the restatement itself. 
 157. Tamara A. Lambert, Benjamin L. Luippold & Chad M. Stefaniak, Audit Partner 
Disclosure: An Experimental Exploration of Accounting Information Contagion, 30 BEHAV. RES. IN 
ACCT. 27, 37 (2018). 
 158. It is also possible that shareholders would use the information when voting, making 
private enforcement more effective. With more information, shareholders could provide more 
informed votes on auditor ratification, and they could target individual directors on the audit 
committee if they were not pleased with the auditor selection. However, due to rational apathy in 
voting, this avenue is less likely.   
      159. Other recent work has called for increases in shareholders’ power over the auditor’s 
appointment. See Coffee, supra note 64, at 2 (“[A] more feasible approach would be to give investors 
greater ability to select and remove the auditor.”). 
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firms dominate the market, is a constant regulatory concern. Various 
proposals ranging from mandatory multi-firm audits to a forced 
breakup of the Big Four have gotten some traction, particularly in the 
United Kingdom.160 
By contrast, my proposal could increase competition naturally. 
As noted previously, some of the reasons why issuers are hesitant to 
terminate their auditors include that (1) they are concerned the market 
will “punish” them if they switch to a non–Big Four auditor; (2) there 
can be significant costs associated with switching (e.g., employees at the 
issuer will incur significant time getting the new auditor up to speed); 
and (3) there are often few options, as some firms have more industry 
expertise and other firms are excluded because they provide certain 
nonaudit services.  
Public knowledge of the auditor’s reputation could mitigate 
these concerns. If the market trusts the reputation of an individual 
partner, clients may be able to switch to non–Big Four accounting firms 
without penalty if they switch to (or with) a highly regarded audit 
partner.161 Further, if they switch with a partner who brings her team 
to the new firm, the costs for the “new” team to get set up will be trivial. 
Finally, even if the new accounting firm has limited experience with an 
industry, there may be a partner with substantial expertise—or the 
accounting firm may hire a partner specifically to obtain such expertise.  
Ultimately, accounting firms could look more like law firms, 
which have thriving lateral markets.162 Accounting firms, at present, do 
not. After all, if an individual auditor has no public reputation and her 
clients are unlikely to follow her switch, recruiting a lateral is far less 
attractive. However, based on similar industries, such as credit and 
firm analysts, there is reason to believe that building a partner’s brand 
 
 160. See Louis Ashworth, Pressure Mounts on the CMA to Break Up Accountancy’s Big Four, 
CITY A.M. (Oct. 1, 2018, 12:34 AM), http://www.cityam.com/264093/pressure-mounts-cma-break-
up-accountancys-big-four [https://perma.cc/4TQE-F6HX]; Paulina Duran, Australia Calls on Bank 
Outsiders to Break Up Big Four Dominance, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2018, 11:40 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-banks/australia-calls-on-bank-outsiders-to-break-
up-big-four-dominance-idUSKBN1KO0EV [https://perma.cc/HQF2-9TCZ]; Madison Marriage, EY 
Hits Back at Calls to Break Up Big Four Accounting Firms, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/36188f82-b6a9-11e8-bbc3-ccd7de085ffe [https://perma.cc/T2XE-
R34E]; Joseph Smith, Multi-firm Audits can Break the Big Four’s Oligopoly, FIN. TIMES (July 23, 
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/bc5afbc4-a3fd-11e9-a282-2df48f366f7d [https://perma.cc/G8Y9-
HTV4]. 
   161. For example, perhaps a high-quality partner who leaves KPMG for a smaller accounting 
firm, such as Grant Thornton, would be able to retain his clients because market participants 
would trust the partner, even though Grant Thornton is outside the Big Four. 
 162. Dylan Jackson, Law Firm Lifers and the Hot Lateral Market, LAW.COM: DAILY BUS. REV. 
(Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2019/04/02/law-firm-lifers-and-the-hot-
lateral-market/ [https://perma.cc/DYM4-3CPK]. 
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separately from that of her firm could have this type of effect on mobility 
and competition.163 
In sum, there is reason to believe that individual auditor 
reputation markets could increase competition in the industry. Of 
course, this is not a perfect fix, and there remains reason to doubt that 
individual accountability alone would break up the Big Four. 
Nonetheless, it is a possibility worth pursuing—and would certainly be 
more politically palatable than drastic regulatory action to break up the 
Big Four.  
C. Objections 
There are many reasons to be skeptical of reputation markets 
for individual auditors. In this section, I discuss some common 
objections. 
1. Audit Fees 
First, a greater focus on the reputation of the audit partner will 
likely raise the costs of an audit. The auditor will bear increased risk, 
which will incentivize her to (1) incur more audit hours to validate the 
underlying opinion and (2) increase her personal compensation to 
account for the increased risk. As described below, empirical work 
indicates that this conjecture has already occurred, as there is evidence 
that audit fees increased after firms were required to disclose the name 
of the lead audit partner (the biggest step in developing reputation 
markets).  
Although not ideal, the benefits of individual accountability 
outweigh the increase in fees, particularly because the increase in fees 
associated with disclosure of the partner’s identity appears to be 
relatively modest. For example, when examining the change in audit 
fees after mandatory audit partner disclosure in the United Kingdom, 
Professors Carcello and Li found average audit fees of $475,900 in the 
pre-period and $477,000 in the post-period.164 Similar studies have 
 
 163. See Section I.C.2 (explaining the improved audit quality that results from individual 
auditor brands). Further consider, for example, Mike Mayo. After Credit Suisse First Boston fired 
Mayo, he worked at CLSA (a Chinese brokerage) but remained a highly visible presence in the 
media. After CLSA, he went to work for Wells Fargo, bringing members of his team with him. 
Laura Noonan & Ben McLannahan, Big Banks’ Critic Mike Mayo to Join Wells Fargo, FIN. TIMES 
(June 12, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ ccce5678-4f35-11e7-bfb8-997009366969 
[https://perma.cc/EBH8-ME2J]. 
 164. Joseph V. Carcello & Chan Li, Costs and Benefits of Requiring an Engagement Partner 
Signature: Recent Experience in the United Kingdom, 88 ACCT. REV. 1511, 1524 (2013). The 
difference was not significant with univariate results, but it becomes significant in regression 
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examined whether U.S. audit fees also increased following the 
introduction of Form AP, but the results have been inconsistent.165 
Regardless, even if the findings that the disclosure led to a 
modest increase in audit fees are correct, the cost of poor accounting 
quality is far more significant. On average, prior work has found that 
restatements result in losses of market value of 9.2%,166 far exceeding 
the financial cost of the misstatement.167 For even the smallest company 
in the S&P 500, an estimate of –9.2% suggests a loss of over $260 
million.168 If the development of individual brands provides even a 1% 
decrease in the frequency of significant audit failures, that savings will, 
on average, far, far exceed the increase in audit fees. 
2. Increased Conservatism 
Second, this proposal may lead to more conservative financial 
reporting. If auditors are concerned with their individual reputations, 
or if they believe the disclosure will increase their risk of legal liability, 
they may be overly conservative. Preliminary evidence suggests that 
such an effect is likely. In the United Kingdom, the frequency of going- 
concern opinions was 3.3% in the year prior to audit partner disclosure 
and 6.5% in the year following audit partner disclosure.169 
On the one hand, excessive conservatism does not improve audit 
quality, as it sends a false signal to the market. On the other hand, 
accounting is, by definition, conservative. As a whole, the profession has 
chosen to err on the side of conservatism. For example, this is the 
intuition for why assets are recorded at historical cost and written down 
if their value decreases—but are not “written up” if they appreciate. 
Moreover, companies may provide additional disclosures that 
counteract the conservatism of auditors. For example, over 90% of 
companies now provide both Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
 
analysis with control variables. Id. at 1532. Of course, this only reflects any increase associated 
with the disclosure of the engagement partner, which is only one aspect of increasing individual 
accountability. And this reflects an increase in the United Kingdom, which is less litigious than 
the United States. 
       165. See supra note 61. 
 166. Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, Vernon J. Richardson & Susan Scholz, Determinants of Market 
Reactions to Restatement Announcements, 37 J. ACCT. ECON. 59, 60 (2004) (finding mean returns 
of -9.2% over a two-day event window). 
 167. Karpoff, Lee & Martin, supra note 156, at 594–96. 
 168. October 2019 List of All S&P 500 Stocks & Companies, SURE DIVIDEND (Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://www.suredividend.com/sp-500-stocks/.  
 169. Carcello & Li, supra note 164, at 1524. 
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(“GAAP”) and non–GAAP financials in their annual reports.170 The 
non–GAAP numbers are rarely audited.171 Therefore, the increased 
conservatism only affects a subset of the information that companies 
report to their investors, allowing companies to fight back if they believe 
the auditor is overly conservative. 
3. Personal Concerns 
Third, there are personal concerns for the auditor herself. 
Introducing reputation markets raises serious concerns regarding 
fairness, safety, and privacy. It is entirely possible that some auditors 
will unfairly receive an undeserved reputational stigma. For example, 
perhaps a certain auditor is put on risky audits precisely because he is 
of high quality and best positioned to prevent misstatements. This 
auditor is likely to be associated with a higher than baseline probability 
of audit failure, an outcome entirely inconsistent with his actual 
quality. To prevent such outcomes, high-quality partners may refuse to 
work with high-risk clients, even though these are the clients that 
would benefit most from their expertise. 
Of course, this issue is not unique to auditors. Perhaps most 
similarly, FINRA has comparable concerns with Brokercheck, its online 
database containing past broker misconduct. This database includes 
unverified customer complaints, prompting concerns that certain 
brokers are unfairly targeted. In response, FINRA allows brokers two 
options. First, brokers can respond to each complaint, and their 
response will be publicly visible just below the initial complaint.172 
Second, brokers may expunge infractions from the database.173 
Greater individual reputational risk also raises concerns 
regarding safety and privacy. Individuals (and their families) involved 
in high-profile financial failures have been threatened. For example, 
when it was publicly disclosed in March 2009 that American 
International Group (“AIG”) intended to pay over $150 million in 
 
 170. Matthew Stock, Deceptive Non-GAAP Financials Will Lead to Future SEC Whistleblower 
Awards, ACCT. TODAY (May 18, 2018), https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/deceptive-non-
gaap-financials-will-lead-to-future-sec-whistleblower-awards [https://perma.cc/DE2F-7QVW]. 
 171. See PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BOARD, AS 2710: OTHER INFORMATION IN 
DOCUMENTS CONTAINING AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, 
https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AS2710.aspx (last visited Aug. 23, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/4XCF-X8R9] (“[T]he auditor has no obligation to perform any procedures to 
corroborate other information contained in a document.”). 
      172. Guidelines for Broker Comments on BrokerCheck, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, 
https://www.finra.org/registration-exams-ce/individuals/guidelines-broker-comments-
brokercheck (last accessed Oct. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/D5DN-22TV]. 
 173. See Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 45, at 5–6 (describing the process and frequency of 
expungement).  
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employee bonuses after receiving a taxpayer-funded bailout at the 
height of the financial crisis, AIG employees received death threats.174 
Consequently, AIG had to hire guards and required an increased police 
presence.175 In sum, although society has chosen to require individual 
disclosure for other actors,176 the potential safety issues are serious 
concerns. 
4. Litigation Risk 
Fourth, there are concerns that the disclosures will give rise to 
private liability beyond reputational costs.177 Exposing individuals to 
such litigation risk could raise audit costs considerably and, as 
mentioned earlier, would not necessarily increase audit quality. 
Although an increase in litigation risk may ultimately be necessary to 
induce the proper incentives,178 a market-oriented solution is preferable 
to increasing litigation risk at this time.179 
 
 174. Brady Dennis & David Cho, Rage at AIG Swells As Bonuses Go Out, WASH. POST (Mar. 
17, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/16/ 
AR2009031602961.html [https://perma.cc/78VL-AKU4]. 
 175. Id.; see also AIG Bonus Outrage has Employees Living in Fear, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 
20, 2009, 6:47 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29802167/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/t/aig-
bonus-outrage-has-employees-living-fear/ [https://perma.cc/Y2MJ-22BA] (“Security companies in 
New York say the financial crisis has created brisk business in everything from bomb-sniffing dogs 
to bodyguards for executives.”). 
 176. For example, we require such disclosure for broker-dealers, investment advisers, and 
sexual offenders, among others. See Megan’s Law, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d), (repealed 2006) ( requiring 
the release of relevant information to protect the public from sexually violent offenders); 
BROKERCHECK, https://brokercheck.finra.org/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4BWU-
TGGP] (providing a free tool to research financial brokers’ background and experience); 
INVESTMENT ADVISER PUB. DISCLOSURE, https://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/ (last visited Mar. 19, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/55DU-PGHS] (offering Form ADV and investment adviser history).  
 177. See Cathy J. Cole, Audit Partner Accountability and Audit Transparency: Partner 
Signature or Disclosure Requirement, 14 J. ACCT. & FIN. 84, 94 (2014) (describing comment letters 
noting potential increases in litigation risk). 
 178. Past reforms have focused on reducing conflicts of interest rather than increasing private 
enforcement. See Coffee, supra note 64, at 2 (noting that prior reforms imposed consulting 
restrictions, a cooling-off period, and independence rules). However, policymakers have now 
reduced conflicts of interest to the extent reasonably feasible. Should there be another significant 
accounting failure along the lines of Enron, it is plausible that Congress will increase litigation 
risk despite that its effect on audit quality is unclear. This pending threat provides greater 
incentive to find a market-based solution. 
 179. Two more objections bear mention. First, it is possible that a greater focus on individual 
brands will have no effect, as auditors already have significant incentives to perform high-quality 
work. If so, there would be a cost with no benefit. However, given that some preliminary research 
on disclosure of the name of the audit partner suggests this disclosure alone had an effect, this 
objection seems inconsistent with the data. Second, another objection is that separating the brand 
of an auditor from that of her firm may reduce firm accountability. If so, the firm may reduce the 
support that it provides to auditors. However, given that audit partners own the firm and 
determine its spending priorities, the partners are incentivized to continue funding the firm’s 
infrastructure and internal support to the degree they are beneficial. 
4. Honigsberg(Do Not Delete) 11/16/2019  12:48 PM 
1916 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:6:1871 
III. TOWARD OPTIMAL AUDITOR BRAND DEVELOPMENT 
Regulators in the United States recently mandated disclosure of 
the engagement partner—the preliminary step in developing individual 
auditor brands. However, this disclosure is only a first step. For private 
markets to develop useful Auditor Scorecards and build efficient 
reputation markets, regulators should mandate disclosure of additional 
relevant information and ensure that usable information is revealed 
through their enforcement actions.180 
A. Additional Disclosures 
To be most effective, the Scorecard needs to contain information 
that will allow market participants to identify high- and low-quality 
auditors. With sufficient time-series data, the partner name alone will 
provide a noisy signal. However, regulators should mandate disclosure 
of information that will provide the market with a more precise signal—
and sooner. 
1. PCAOB Disciplinary Proceedings 
For starters, the PCAOB should be permitted to publicly disclose 
PCAOB disciplinary proceedings. As noted earlier, these proceedings 
are confidential and nonpublic unless all parties consent to make the 
information public,181 and the confidentiality extends until the case is 
either settled or all appeals have been exhausted.182 This provides 
parties with significant incentives to fully draw out the appeals process, 
including appealing any discipline up to the SEC. This can take years. 
Officially, the explanation for the confidentiality is that PCAOB 
disciplinary proceedings contain market-moving information, and 
disclosing such unproven allegations prematurely would disadvantage 
issuers. That is, disclosure of a PCAOB disciplinary proceeding not only 
punishes the accounting firm, but also the client. Unofficially, 
congressional staffers say that the explanation for the confidentiality is 
that the accounting firms have lobbied heavily for its protection. 
 
 180. Professor Coffee has similarly called for a scorecard-related disclosure. In particular, he 
called for disclosure of the grades that audit firms receive from regulators. Coffee, supra note 64, 
at 10. But, due to individual variation, it is an empirical question as to whether the general grade 
is reflective of the individual audits.  
 181. Modesti, supra note 76. 
 182. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(d)(1) (2012).  
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Bipartisan congressional representatives have proposed to make the 
proceedings public, all to no avail.183  
Of course, there needs to be some level of certainty before 
disclosing the disciplinary proceedings. However, the requirement that 
all appeals must be complete is excessive and deprives the public of 
timely and value-relevant information. It is also unnecessary to protect 
the issuer, as regulators can release disciplinary actions against an 
auditor while withholding the name of the issuer.184 Going forward, 
similar to the SEC’s process, the disciplinary proceedings should be 
disclosed when the regulator decides to file an enforcement action.185 
2. Overseas Auditors 
Regulators should require disclosure not only on the existence of 
other audit participants, but on the lead auditor’s supervision of those 
other auditors. As mentioned previously, supervision can vary wildly. 
Providing this additional context would make the information in Form 
AP far more meaningful. 
Further, Form AP requires disclosure of the use of component 
auditors, but it does not require any information on offshore auditors. 
Regulators should require that accounting firms disclose the use of 
offshore auditors and the type of work that is sent to these offshore 
auditors. If the information is nonjudgmental audit work, such as 
counting widgets, it seems unlikely that investors will be terribly 
concerned. However, if the offshore auditor is performing judgmental 
work that requires, for example, the subjective determination of 
whether an accounting treatment is acceptable, investors are likely to 
be more concerned. 
B. Enforcement Priorities 
Finally, to the extent possible and equitable, regulators should 
highlight the fault of the individual(s) involved when bringing 
disciplinary actions against auditors. Individual accountability in 
corporate enforcement was a focus of the Obama Administration—Sally 
Yates authored a memo stating that the DOJ should focus on the 
 
 183. See sources cited supra note 75.  
      184.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 123. 
 185. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT 
MANUAL 18 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UYK8-Y2NZ]. 
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individuals involved in corporate malfeasance186—and some regulatory 
actions already take this approach.187 However, the Trump 
Administration has appeared to back off individual accountability in 
corporate enforcement, arguing that it is prohibitively costly to make a 
case against all individuals involved.188 It is unclear to what extent the 
Trump administration’s decision to focus less on individual 
accountability for corporate actors is political, as the administration 
continues to focus on individuals in other settings such as immigration. 
However, if the administration is correct that individual accountability 
is prohibitively costly for corporate actors, a compromise could be to 
name the individuals involved even if the government brings its case 
against the institution as a whole. Reputation markets do not need 
formal enforcement to incorporate subpar conduct.  
Further, in some instances, regulators decline to pursue 
discipline if the infractions appear too modest. Because even seemingly 
minor infractions, such as customer complaints, are significant 
predictors of bad acts in other areas,189 it would be worthwhile for the 
SEC and PCAOB to amend these enforcement policies. When possible, 
regulators should pursue even modest infractions to provide a public 
record of these infractions, as they would still likely provide important 
information to the market. 
C. Visibility and Presentation 
Finally, to spur the development of auditor reputation markets, 
the critical disclosures should be easily accessible. At present, auditor-
relevant information is disclosed through issuer and auditor filings on 
the SEC and PCAOB’s websites, disciplinary actions by any number of 
agencies, and company filings abroad. For example, as mentioned 
earlier, the identity of the audit partner is disclosed on the PCAOB’s 
website in a form filed by the auditor, but it must be linked to 
 
     186. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, on 
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/2JY6-97RD]. 
 187. Dylan Tokar, The Department of Justice Is Turning Back the Clock on Corporate 
Accountability, NATION (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/financial-crisis-justice-
department-corporate-prosecutions-yates-memo/ [https://perma.cc/Q6D2-FKAS]. Consistent with 
the Yates memo, some disciplinary actions already name the auditor(s) involved. Others, however, 
are more generally against a firm even when the action concerns an individual. See PUB. COMPANY 
ACCT. OVERSIGHT BOARD, SETTLED DISCIPLINARY ORDERS 4 (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Decisions/Documents/105-2018-020-Deloitte-Canada.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S85G-H7HA] (stating that Deloitte Canada violated independence rules, but not 
stating the name of the auditor in question). 
 188. Tokar, supra note 187. 
 189. Egan, Matvos & Seru, supra note 45, at 246, 248. 
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information disclosed through other sources (for example, disciplinary 
actions or audit failures) to be useful.  
Market participants would benefit from straightforward 
disclosure in one location. Equity analysts have long created reports 
summarizing company performance and recommending whether to 
buy, sell, or hold the stock. Credit rating analysts use a similar system 
for company debt. And financial advisors provide their employment and 
disciplinary history online through websites maintained by FINRA and 
the SEC. Even scorecards on mutual funds are now available.190 
Although the Auditor Scorecards would be most effective with 
the additional disclosures described previously, there is already 
sufficient information to provide a noisy signal of the audit partner’s 
quality. However, with the additional information described, the 
Scorecard could be more similar to what is provided for financial 
advisors.191 Providing all this information in a centralized location 
would greatly reduce the costs of acquisition and make the information 
more broadly accessible. Although there is reason to doubt the 
effectiveness of such disclosures in purely consumer contexts,192 
disclosures seem to drive behavioral changes in securities markets.193 
 
 190. See e.g., Mutual Fund Management Co, INVESTOR, https://investor.com/rias/mutual-fund-
management-co-107538 (last updated Aug. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/R2W9-5CFL] (providing 
information about the mutual fund, including its assets under management and disciplinary 
history).  
      191.  In particular, it could show the auditor’s employment history (years of experience, clients, 
employers, education), clients, fees associated with prior audits, critical audit matters associated 
with prior audits, use of overseas auditors (if applicable), disciplinary history (if applicable), and 
any audit failures associated with his clients (if applicable). 
 192. See Daniel E. Ho, Zoe C. Ashwood & Cassandra Handan-Nader, The False Promise of 
Simple Information Disclosure: New Evidence on Restaurant Hygiene Grading 4 (Stan. Inst. for 
Econ. Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 17-043, Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/17-043.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM6K-
H3XT] (“These data lead to a simple conclusion: there is no evidence that LA’s grading system 
reduced foodborne illness.”).  
 193. See Colleen Honigsberg, Hedge Fund Regulation and Fund Governance: Evidence on the 
Effects of Mandatory Disclosure Rules, 57 J. ACCT. RES. 845, 884 (2019) (“My findings provide 
evidence that the mandatory disclosure requirements led funds to make changes in their internal 
governance . . . .”); see also Hans B. Christensen et al., The Real Effects of Mandated Information 
on Social Responsibility in Financial Reports: Evidence from Mine-Safety Records, 64 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 284, 290 (2017) (“Overall, the evidence in this section indicates that compliance with the 
Mine Act increased in response to MSD.”); Nico Lehmann, Do Corporate Governance Analysts 
Matter? Evidence from the Expansion of Governance Analyst Coverage, 57 J. ACCT. RES. 721, 754 
(2018) (“The results indicate that the initiation of ISS coverage causes firm-level improvements in 
governance quality, liquidity, financial analyst following, and investor breadth.”). 
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D. Private Actors 
Finally, Auditor Scorecards are most likely to be effective if 
developed by private actors. As noted previously, there are concerns 
that regulatory oversight is likely to be suboptimal due to limitations 
such as regulatory capture and lobbying. Rather than risk the 
Scorecard be implemented in a suboptimal fashion (or not at all), 
private actors could use the business model of proxy advisors to develop 
and sell the information.  
There is one additional benefit to having private actors develop 
the Scorecard: these actors could serve as a counterweight to the 
influence of accounting firms. One reason that accounting firms are 
likely successful when lobbying to prevent disclosures is that there is 
not a comparable actor arguing in favor of these disclosures. With 
private actors running the Scorecard—and therefore using the 
disclosures and reaping the financial success—they would have 
incentives to counteract the accounting firms and demand additional 
disclosures that they believe would improve the accuracy of the 
Scorecard. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite prior efforts by lawmakers and corporate fiduciaries, 
there remains reason to doubt that auditors have sufficient incentive to 
perform consistent, high-quality audits. Indeed, PCAOB inspections 
from 2005 through 2016 find that, on average, 25% of audits inspected 
were severely deficient. To induce higher audit quality, I propose to 
create a reputation market for individual auditors. 
This approach would have four benefits. First, individual 
accountability would increase the audit partner’s costs of audit failure, 
thus better aligning the incentives of the audit partner with those of the 
shareholders. Second, increased accountability could mitigate the 
increased audit risk associated with the use of overseas auditors. Third, 
with more information on the individual auditor, market participants 
would be able to select higher-quality auditors. Finally, individual 
accountability would plausibly increase competition in the accounting 
industry.  
To achieve a reputation market for individual auditors, I propose 
the creation of Auditor Scorecards providing detailed information on 
each audit partner. Although the information already publicly available 
could provide a noisy signal of audit partner quality, the Scorecard 
would be more effective if regulators disclosed additional information. 
In particular, PCAOB disciplinary proceedings should be made publicly 
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available, more detail on the oversight of overseas auditors should be 
provided, and the auditor at fault should be named in regulatory 
enforcement actions. These sources of information would provide 
ongoing and valuable information regarding each partner’s quality. 
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APPENDIX A: PCAOB ANNUAL REPORT DATA 
Inspection Year Percent Not Sufficient Audits Number of Audits Inspected 
2005 31% 988 
2006 20% 1080 
2007 14% 1035 
2008 16% 897 
2009 19% 1080 
2010 31% 950 
2011 30% 825 
2012 30% 910 
2013 33% 865 
2014 25% 780 
2015 29% 810 
2016 23% 780 
This table presents data compiled from PCAOB Inspection Reports covering the 
years from 2005 through 2016. The “Percent Not Sufficient Audits” column 
represents the percentage of audit opinions the PCAOB believed should not have 
been issued because the audit itself was so poorly performed that the auditor did 
not have sufficient basis on which to issue an opinion. This percentage is calculated 
as the total number of “Not Sufficient” audits divided by the number of audits 
inspected by the PCAOB. The “Number of Audits Inspected” category represents 
the number of audits inspected annually by the PCAOB (note that the PCAOB 
frequently inspects only a portion of these audits, not the entire audit). The 
statistical analysis underlying these data are on file with the author, and are based 
on PCAOB Inspection Reports available at PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., 
FIRM INSPECTION REPORTS, https://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). 
